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This report presents the conclusions of the Canfin-Grandjean Commission 
and proposes to the President of the French Republic paths of action to mobilize 
increased public and private funding in the fight against climate change. It also 
forwards proposals on how the French government could advance the ‘innovative 
climate finance agenda’ in the various international forums in which it participates 
(G7, G20, IMF, OECD, etc.). The present report covers the financial instruments 
identified more than a decade ago as ‘innovative’ (financial transaction tax, carbon 
market auctions revenues, etc.). It, however, goes further to also look at the means of 
finding ‘innovative’ ways of using existing tools in the ‘toolboxes’ of both private and 
public actors to scale-up financial flows for the low-carbon economy.
Acting on climate 
is not a choice between 
the economy and environment. 
All we need is political will, 
but political will is 
a renewable resource. 
Al Gore, September 23rd, 2014
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 Figure 1  The triangle of paradoxes
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the conclusions of the Canfin-Grandjean Commission and 
proposes to the President of the French Republic paths of action to mobilize 
increased public and private funding in the fight against climate change. It also 
forwards proposals on how the French government could advance the ‘innovative 
climate finance agenda’ in the various international forums in which it participates 
(G7, G20, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, etc.). The present report covers the financial instruments identified 
more than a decade ago as ‘innovative’ (financial transaction tax, carbon market 
auctions revenues, etc.). It, however, goes further to also look at the means of 
finding ‘innovative’ ways of using existing tools in the ‘toolboxes’ of both private 
and public actors to scale-up financial flows for the low-carbon economy.
This report is linked to two concurrent processes.
Firstly, this report is part of the larger run-up to CoP21 to be held in Paris 
between the 30th of November and the 11th of December, 2015. The core of the 
proposals forwarded in this report falls outside stricto sensu of the scope covered 
by negotiations within the framework United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Nevertheless, they serve to support the ‘Compact ’ 
or the ‘Alliance’ for climate that will be reached in Paris: this will include the formal 
UNFCCC agreement, as well as commitments made by public and private actors 
outside of the agreement itself. The proposals presented in this report can therefore 
contribute to the success of the financial dimension of the ‘Paris Climat Compact’ 
that, in our eyes, consists of three dimensions:  
– Demonstrate how to honor the commitment made by developed countries at 
Copenhagen in 2009 of “mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to 
address the needs of developing countries”;
– Assist the most vulnerable countries to adapt to the consequences of climate 
change through dedicated commitments; and
– Make CoP21 a political milestone that communicates to economic decision makers 
and investors the coming acceleration in evolution of the ‘rules of the game’ to ensure 
that public and private investments are compatible with keeping the increase in global 
average temperature below 2°C. 
Secondly, this report recognizes the current global economic context marked by the 
three elements include in the ‘Triangle of Paradoxes’:
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Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015, using data from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2014 and New 
Climate Economy, 2014
Investments in infrastructures Green infrastructures
Low Estimate High Estimate 
650 bn
5 trillion
340 bn
5 trillion
1. Calculated by Canfin / Grandjean 
after UNFCCC data
 Figure 2  The share of green infrastructure investments  
is estimated in the range of 7 to 13% in 2013
This portion of total investment is clearly insufficient and is due to many 
factors analyzed in this report. In order to achieve a rapid increase in the share 
of ‘green’ investment requisite for the climate change challenge, we propose 
a ‘low-carbon financial roadmap’ coherent with the objective of limiting global 
warming to less than 2°C.
The monetary policies implemented to date by central banks have not led to a 
return to historic investment levels. Investment levels remain below those in 2008, 
This is the case despite the dramatic decline in interest rates in high-income 
countries. This in turn, has led to a strong demand from institutional investors for 
infrastructure investment opportunities - allowing a diversification of their financial 
portfolios given the current low returns on government bonds.
The transition to a low-carbon economy is a necessity in the light of climate 
change, but also a way of overcoming the current global macroeconomic and 
macro-financial difficulties. This will lead to an increase in low-carbon infrastructure. 
At present, only 7 to 13% of total global investments in infrastructure can be 
defined as ‘green’ 1. 
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 Figure 3  The four dimensions of a low-carbon financial roadmap
Carbon price signal
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Financial regulation  
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Financing a low-  
carbon economy
The individual proposals that make up this roadmap are detailed in the Section 
3.1 of the report and can be grouped around the following four dimensions:
1. The carbon price signal
The first challenge is to phase out fossil fuel subsidies that act in many ways as 
a negative carbon price. According to researchers from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), they represent an economic cost of around $ 10 million dollars per 
minute! This is well above current subsidies for re-newable energy. The recent oil 
price decline is a historic opportunity to reduce these subsidies.
Furthermore, given the intense international discussion prior to the CoP21, 
we propose that devel-oped and emerging countries agree on a voluntarily 
basis – and outside of the scope of the UNFCCC international agreement – to 
a ‘carbon corridor’ or a ‘carbon target’ with a minimum target price of 15 to 20 
dollars/ton of CO2 in 2020, and a maximum target price of 60 to 80 dollars/ton 
of CO2 in 2030/2035.
This ‘carbon corridor’ would allow Governments at CoP21 to transmit the 
necessary common political message, as well as the needed flexibility in price 
levels to gather countries with different levels of development.
2.  Financial regulation and the mobilization of private financial actors
This report recognizes the numerous initiatives taken since the UN Climate Summit 
in New York in September 2014. It also reflects the unprecedented awareness in 
the financial world that has led to the integration of the climate challenge. This 
integration has evolved from being seen as part of ‘extra-financial’ or ‘social and 
environmental responsibility,’ to a potential major financial risk threatening the 
business models of companies, and financial stability in general. Actions in this 
area are accelerating as demonstrated by the following examples:
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–  the mandate given in April 2015 by the G20 to the Financial Stability Board (FSB);
–  the vote in France in May on legislation mandating asset managers to communicate 
information on both their exposure to climate risks, particularly in terms of carbon 
footprint of their portfolios, and their contribution to limiting global warming; and 
–  the work of the People’s Bank of China on ‘greening the Chinese financial 
system’ as part of the preparation of the next five-year plan.
3. Development banks 1 
This report lists proposals for financial innovation that will enable development 
banks to finance more low-carbon projects and increase their leveraging of private 
finance for these projects (development of guarantees, new role of development 
banks in relation to capital markets, strengthened capacity to support the emergence 
of low-carbon projects, management of political and convertibility risks, etc.). 
Given that each development bank is different, we propose that France requests 
each development bank develop its own ‘2°C financial roadmap’ by CoP21. This 
document should explain how each institution sees its role in financing the low-
carbon economy; the commitments it can make to support this transition; any 
constraints it faces including, if necessary, such as capital limitations, etc.
4. Low-carbon, climate-resilient infrastructure
Infrastructures is an essential part of the investments needs: sustainable urban 
infrastructure; production infrastructures and transmission networks for electricity; 
information technology (IT) networks enabling the convergence of the green economy 
and the digital economy, etc. Therefore, the goal is to remedy the current delay that 
the global economy has accumulated in financing infrastructures; and the reallocation 
of this funding from carbon intensive models to ‘low carbon.’  This reallocation has 
a relatively small additional cost, as demonstrated by the New Climate Economy 
report released in 2014. 2 Nevertheless, some of the intrinsic characteristics of ‘low-
carbon’ infrastructure may lead to blockages or increase the cost of capital. This can 
include the absence of historic data to evaluate the future cash flow, weak expertise 
of administrations to integrate low-carbon specifications into public procurement and 
tenders, untested or unfamiliar economic models, etc.. Identifying and overcoming 
these obstacles, particularly in developing countries, is a key dimension of the low-
carbon financial roadmap. That is why we propose that some of the international 
community’s development objectives should be formulated as goals, such as a 
decrease in the cost of capital for renewable energy in developing countries.
The combination of these four dimensions can give coherence and effectiveness 
to the financing of a low-carbon economy. The resulting integrated roadmap should 
be monitored by the international community, which is not yet the case today. 
In order to ensure continuity in the monitoring of the roadmap to finance a low-
carbon economy, we propose that before the CoP21 the IMF and the World Bank 
should be mandated to monitor the implementation of this roadmap, in coordination 
with institutions deemed relevant to perform this task, particularly those under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
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1. « To this end we also commit 
to develop long term national 
low-carbon strategies », G7, 
Déclaration de juin 2015
10 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE ROADMAP TO FINANCE 
A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
 1 Establish a monitoring process for the low-carbon financial roadmap to ensure its 
longevity beyond CoP21. The IMF and the World Bank could be charged with the supervision 
and implementation of this roadmap, in coordination with the institutions deemed relevant to 
perform this task, particularly within UNFCCC. The objective will be to monitor, in particular, 
the development of the carbon price signal (including phasing out fossil fuel subsidies), the 
reforms allowing the removal of barriers to investment in low-carbon infrastructure, the 
‘2°C roadmaps’ of development banks, the integration of climate risk in financial regulation, 
the relative volume of ‘green’ investments compared with total global investments in 
infrastructure and the evolution in the decoupling of GDP and greenhouse gas emissions. n
 3 Integrate climate in macro-economic models. The integration of a 2°C scenario throughout 
the macroeconomic forecasts and models of international institutions (IMF, OECD, etc.) and finance 
ministries in order to ensure a better coherence between short-term analysis and forecasts, and 
long-term low-carbon objectives. Any model or forecast, for example energy market forecasts, that 
is incompatible with the 2°C limit should be explicitly identified as such. n
 2 Establish a carbon price signal. A voluntary commitment from developed and emerging 
countries to put an explicit carbon price signal into effect, between a minimum target price 
of 15 to 20 dollars/ton of CO2 in 2020, and a maximum target price of 60 to 80 dollars/ton of 
CO2 in 2030/2035, according to levels of development.  n
 5 Request that each development bank develop a ‘2°C investment roadmap’ compatible 
with the 2°C limit. This roadmap should specify how the development banks intends to 
contribute to the fulfillment of the 2°C limit agreed to by the international community. A 
joint monitoring process by multilateral, regional and bilateral development banks could be 
established, with a public report presented every two years during General Meetings of the 
IMF and the World Bank. n
 4 Development of national strategies to finance the decarbonization of the economies.  
Governments, beginning with developed countries, should produce national decarbonization 
strategies for their economies, covering the needed financing, both public and private. France 
has adopted the principal of such a strategy in its law on the energy transition for green 
growth; the G7 countries also committed to this principal in June 20151. Among the key 
indicators for such strategies could be the relative volume of ‘green’ investments compared 
with total global investments made each year, combined with annual targets. France could 
propose to that IMF and the World Bank monitor this indicator, country by country, and to 
aggregate investment levels at the global level. n
_15_MOBILIZING CLIMATE FINANCE - A ROADMAP TO FINANCE A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
1. OECD Key partners are  
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia  
and South Africa.
 6 Increase the use by development banks of instruments and tools with high leverage 
ratios, such as guarantees, subordinated debt or credit enhancement, to increase climate 
finance at comparatively low costs. France could request development banks to estimate their 
capacity to mobilize additional climate finance through an increased use of these tools.
In the particular case of France, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is today the only 
international development finance institution subject to Basel 3 prudential regulation. According 
to our estimations, if aligned with the prudential frameworks used by other development banks, 
the AFD could increase its activity by  € 1 to 2 billion. n
 10 Adopt the methodology developed by the OECD in June 2015 to analyze the 
alignment of public policies with low-carbon development. This is a key means of assessing 
the integration of progressive decarbonization targets in all public policies. We propose that 
France be part of the first countries to commit to apply this framework internally and urge other 
member countries of the OECD and OECD key partners 1 to do so before the CoP21. 
In the particular case of the European Union (EU), the financing of the Juncker Plan totaling 
€ 315 billion could be made conditional on climate co-benefits criteria and projects related 
to the implementation of the low-carbon transition could be prioritized (energy efficiency and 
technology projects). France could communicate broadly on its recent legislative developments 
to integrate climate issues into financial regulation. The French government could propose to 
its European partners to move forward in this direction. France could therefore request that the 
European Commission addresses this issue and proposes a plan of action for the next 2 to 3 
years to be delivered ahead of CoP21. n
 8 Request that the Bank for International Settlements (Basel Committee) define methods 
to include climate risks in stress tests for banks and insurance companies. This should 
include methodologies to assess the performance of assets held by banks and insurance 
companies in the +4°C scenario as developed by the International Panel of experts on Climate 
Change (IPCC). France, in partnership with other countries, could formally request the Basel 
Committee on this issue. n
 7 Include in the 2016 G20 work program the forthcoming recommendations of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), which was mandated in April 2015 by G20 finance ministries 
to analyze the potential impacts of climate change on financial stability. n
 9 Establish a public monitoring system for financial actors’ engagements that have 
multiplied in recent months, including: the integration of climate risk; measuring greenhouse 
gas emissions induced by their financial activities; and increasing financing for the green 
economy. The UNFCCC’s Nazca Platform, which centralizes these commitments, can be used 
and further developed by CoP21 in order to increase the visibility of progress in this area 
within the broader ‘Agenda of Solutions.’ These commitments could be comprised in an 
annual public report.
In the particular case of France, the recently voted provisions of the energy transition for green 
growth legislation require institutional investors to measure the greenhouse gas emissions 
linked to their financial activities and to explain how they address the 2°C scenario. These same 
provisions could be usefully extended to private banks concerning their lending activities. n
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Why does this matter for developing countries? 
Developing countries remain largely outside of existing international private capital 
flows. The reallocation of these flows is therefore principally an issue for developed 
and emerging countries. Nevertheless, the proposed agenda to reorient private capital 
flows holds significant benefits for developing countries.
1. Firstly, mitigation action and the achievement – or not –of the 2°C limit 
by developed and emerging countries will have direct consequences on 
the most vulnerable countries. The sooner investment flows are ‘greened,’ 
the less severe the impacts from climate change will be.
2. An increasing number of African countries are seeing the development 
of domestic capital markets (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia…). These countries 
will benefit from the work realised to integrate climate issues into market 
regulation, both in terms of information systems and risk management.
3. The additional mobilization of risk hedging tools by development banks 
will allow private investors to invest more easily in countries that they do 
not consider today as part of their investment universe.
4. Developing and emerging countries host many of the central banks 
that are the most active in channelling domestic financial flows towards 
green projects. Bangladesh is a striking example, as well as Brazil, China, 
Indonesia. 1 This is thus not only an issue on the ‘Northern political 
agenda,’ but on the contrary, a common concern that has already found 
concrete translation in the global South; at least as much as in the North. 
This increases the potential of international cooperation on the matter. 
In parallel to the integrated global roadmap for the financing a low-carbon 
economy, this report looks at a number of the ‘innovative’ financing instruments that 
could allow the mobilization of additional, and particularly public, climate finance.
Among the existing ‘menu of options for innovative financing,’ 2 this report has 
analyzed in detail: the potential financial resources from the financial transaction 
tax (FTT) under voluntary negotiation between 11 European Member States; the 
potential revenues from carbon offsetting in international transport; and carbon 
market auction revenues. 
France has repeatedly announced its willingness to earmark a significant portion of 
the revenues of a FTT for climate at the international level. The ongoing negotiations 
on such a tax among 11 Member States of the European Union is a key element in 
assisting, notably France, the mobilization of additional public funding for climate in 
order to fulfill the ‘$ 100 billion of Copenhagen’ commitment. To this end, this report 
concludes that at least € 10 billion in revenues from the TTF will be needed in 2020 
among the 11 Member States. Negotiations must conclude no later than September 
in order to optimize its potential contribution to the success of the CoP21.
In terms of international transports, this report has particularly analyzed the case of 
international aviation. In 2010, the aviation sector committed to an aspirational goal of 
carbon-neutral growth from 2020; the specific means of achieving this objective to be 
announced in 2016. In addition to energy efficiency standards for airplanes and engines, 
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whose application must be accelerated and widespread, the implementation of this 
commitment increasingly appears to include the creation of carbon offsetting. If 
focused on developing countries, and in particular the most vulnerable countries, 
this could generate between $ 2 and 6 billion in financial climate flows in 2025. This 
is increasingly recognized as the most economical way for the sector to fulfill its 
engagement. Furthermore, it could also finance at scale the restoration of degraded 
agricultural lands.
Moreover, developed countries’ capacity to mobilize revenues earned from 
carbon markets depends on the sovereign political decision to allocate part of these 
revenues to international actions. If, for example, 25% of revenues generated by the 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) of the European Union were allocated for climate 
in developing countries – compared to 14% today - this could represent between 
€ 3.5 to 5 billion a year on average, over the period 2015-2030, depending on to 
carbon price assumptions.
Finally, mobilizing more climate finance involves several key elements: more public 
funds; the improved leveraging of public funds and the increased use of public 
guarantees to the mobilize private funds; and the scaling-up of private investment 
flows towards a low-carbon economy. Most of the mobilization of public and private 
flows has – and will– come from domestic sources. The role of North / South flows and 
development banks is nevertheless critical, particularly in the least developed countries.
Thus at both the national and international level, the role of government is twofold: to 
provide financing or guarantees, and to establish the rules of the game that incentivize 
the redirection of private investments towards a low-carbon economy.

2. CONTEXT
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2. CONTEXT
2.1  THE TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
2.1.1 The beginning of a decoupling between GDP and CO2 emissions
In 2009, Governments committed to keeping global average temperature increase 
below 2° Celsius above its pre-industrial level. This figure is the result of a political 
decision based on scientific expertise. Recent studies 1 and statements made in 
Bonn early June 2015 demonstrate that high risks are anticipated even with a global 
warming of +1.5°C. 
However, according to the most recent report from the IPCC, if greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions continue to increase at the current pace, by the end of the 
century the average temperature would increase by between 3.7°C and 4.8 °C. 2 
The consequences would be disastrous. As an example, 1.4 billion people could 
experience severe water shortages in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia. 
In a + 4°C world, efforts to combat extreme poverty and hunger would be lost before 
they could even begin and would result in hundreds of millions of people being 
pushed back into poverty in developing countries 3. 
Pursuing this objective together with the aims of economic development requires 
that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth be massively decoupled from GHG 
emissions. Principally, this implies that a significant portion of fossil fuel reserves 
remains in the ground. 4 Considering only fossil fuels, the carbon intensity of the 
world’s GDP was 1,000 gr CO2 per $ Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 5 of GDP in 
the 1960’s: it was around 500 gr CO2 at the beginning of the 21st Century. In 2010, 
it was 400 gr CO2 per $ PPP. With an objective of  2% yearly world GDP growth 
in volume until 2050, the carbon intensity per $PPP should not exceed 60grCO2 
in 2050, or be divided by 6 (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). With a 3% growth rate, it 
should be divided by 10. 
It appears that signs of this decoupling can already be observed: GHG emissions 
from energy were stable in 2014, while GDP has increased by 3%. 
Since 1960, CO2 emissions have increased less rapidly than global GDP.
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Source : Carbone 4, hypothesis of GDP growth assumption of 2% per year from 2010 to 2050
 Figure 4  Growth of global GDP and CO2 emissions from 1960 to 2010
 Figure 5  Projected growth until 2050 of global GDP  
and CO2 emissions in a 2°C scenario
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But this decoupling and the emissions reduction need a change in magnitude for 
the temperature increase to be kept below 2°C at the end of the century. 
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Clearly, such a decoupling cannot be reached through ‘moderation’ alone (i.e. 
consuming less with the same organization and level of capital). This could decrease 
GHG emissions by only a few percentage points. The transition to a low-carbon 
economy requires profound shifts in the current socio-economic models, both in 
developed and developing countries. This massive evolution is within reach today. 
A significant amount of investors – including institutional investors – are looking for 
long-term investment opportunities, such as infrastructure projects (see Section 2.3).
Compatible technologies are developing very rapidly and have often demonstrated 
sufficient economic performance to merit a change in scale. This is due in particular 
to the huge decrease in costs over the past years. In terms of renewable energy, 
a record-breaking capacity of 103GW was installed worldwide in 2014 for an 
investment cost of $ 270 billion1. This occurred despite somewhat faltering sectoral 
policies in Europe and continued massive public support for fossil fuels (see Section 
3.2). Since 2013, more than one in two watts of installed capacity on the planet 
comes from a renewable energy source. In terms of energy efficiency, solutions are 
also now available at a competitive cost. For instance, the French automobile fleet 
burned 20% less energy in 2012 than in 1992; and the average energy consumption 
per square-meter of housing has also decreased by 20% over the same period. 
Even in the agricultural sector, the development of ‘agroecology’ 2 means that 
productive, resilient and resource-efficient practices are now within reach.
Several reports, including that of the Global Commission on the New Climate 
Economy published in 2014, demonstrate that the incremental cost between an 
investment scenario sufficient to satisfy development objectives of developing and 
emerging countries; and a scenario that fulfils these objectives in a manner coherent 
with keeping global warming below 2°C could be modest. This does not even take 
into account the massive economic costs resulting from climate change. Hence, as 
was made clear by the Stern Report in 2006, the cost of inaction is much higher 
than the cost of action. The business and financial world is starting to take notice of 
this transformation, as will be established below (see Section 3.6.1). 
Going one step further, the NCE demonstrates that combatting climate change 
is a prerequisite to future prosperity. Maintaining a 2% annual growth rate in the 
coming decades would not be feasible if the planet were subjected to the impacts 
of a runaway climate change. For example, a possible sharp decrease in crop 
yields due to climate change could lead to severe damage to the agricultural 
sector. Polluted cities congested by hundreds of miles of traffic jams have growing 
negative consequences for productivity, human health, economic output and 
quality of life. Therefore tackling climate change and investing for development are 
not competing objectives. On the contrary, investment in a low-carbon economy is 
conditional to ensuring future prosperity for all (see Figure 11). 
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2.1.2 The milestones of a roadmap to finance a low-carbon economy
The main avenues for reducing the carbon footprint of our economies are 
investments in energy efficiency, low-carbon energy and transport, buildings and 
housing, agriculture and forestry as well as innovation, research, and development. 
More precisely, investment needs can be presented as follows.
–  The decarbonization of all energy sources, starting with electricity, through massive 
investment in renewable energy and associated infrastructure.  According to the 
World Bank for example, the target for average emission for 2050 should be 65gr 
CO2 per kwh, rather than the 680 gr CO2 per kwh observed in 2010 1.
–  The increased electrification of sectors which currently use fossil fuels, which 
will require the overcoming of a number of technological and organizational 
barriers. According to the World Bank, a trajectory compatible with a “2°C 
roadmap” implies increasing the share of electricity in the world’s energy mix 
from 29% to 45% between 2010 and 2050, and a simultaneous decrease of 
fossil energy from 68% to 48%. 
–  The emergence of compact and sustainable cities including buildings renovation 
in existing towns. The main issue in developed countries is the retrofitting of 
existing buildings; in developing countries, it is the adoption of climate-objective 
coherent building codes for new buildings.  
–  The decarbonisation of the transport sector 2. This requires: the pursuit of energy 
efficiency improvements to vehicles and transport; raising the user capacity of 
vehicles; developing public transport; and moderating the broader demand for 
passenger and freight transport. 
–  Controlling the energy consumption of extraction, processing, and industry in 
general. This involves reducing the energy intensity of the processing of raw 
materials, both at the level of the production unit, and more broadly at the global 
level for industry and services. 
–  Projects enabling reforestation, to increase the size of natural carbon sinks. 
Priority actions are laid out in the “New York Declaration on Forests” (UN 
REDD program) 3. 
–  The restoration of the 500 million hectares of degraded land worldwide. This 
is part of the process of adapting to the impacts of climate change. It is key to 
food security, while developing the carbon sinks that are essential to winning the 
race against rising temperatures. An objective of ‘land degradation neutrality’ 
will likely be adopted within the Sustainable Development Goals to be adopted 
in September 2015. This will lead to an objective of restoration of 12 million 
hectares of degraded lands annually. 
–  Shifting to a “circular economy” model, thereby increasing resource efficiency. 
Beyond producing less waste and recycling more, the circular economy breaks 
the linear logic of extraction, processing, consumption and disposal. Adopting 
a circular economy is a necessary step towards carbon neutrality, which must 
be achieved by the end of the century.
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INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT NEEDS  
FOR A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY:  
THE NEW CLIMATE ECONOMY’S SCENARIO
T he numbers presented here are for indicative purposes only and are derived from the 5th 
International Panel of experts on Climate Change (IPCC) 
Assessment Report, and from:
– OECD for rail, railways, airports, ports, 
telecommunications and water/waste ;
– the International Energy Agency (IEA) for power 
generation, electricity networks, and energy end-use 
investment for building, industry and transport. 
The Business As Ususal (BAU) scenario is based on the 
‘6°C scenario’ (6DS) from the IEA’s Energy Technology 
Perspectives 2012, without taking into account the cost 
of climate change impacts; the low-carbon scenario 
is based on the ‘2°C scenario’ (2DS). The low-carbon 
scenario is only marginally more costly than the BAU 
scenario ($ 93 trillion compared to $ 89 trillion). The 
additional low-carbon costs (additional energy efficiency 
and additional low-carbon technology for power 
generation) are partially offset by reduced investments 
in fossil fuels and in compact cities, that engender 
lower overall investment. The operational savings from 
reduced fuel expenditure are not taken into account in 
this scenario and would further reduce the cost of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy. 
The BAU scenario predicts a doubling of air passenger 
traffic, a tripling of airfreight and a quadrupling of 
maritime containers traffic worldwide by 2030. The 2°C 
scenario sees the share of renewables reaching 57% of 
the worlds’ electricity mix by 2050 (compared to 19% in 
2009 and 24% in 2050 in the 6°C scenario). Total primary 
energy supply in the 6°C scenario is projected to increase 
by 85% in 2050 as a result of increased energy demand. 
Due to improved energy efficiency, this increase is limited 
to 35% in the 2°C scenario. The resulting demand for oil, 
natural gas and coal compared to a baseline scenario, 
based on Climate Policy Initiative’s modelling, is estimated 
to be roughly 12%, 9% and 14% lower respectively in 
the low-carbon scenario by 2030. 
IT infrastructure is at the convergence of information 
technology and the green economy – including smart 
grids, energy savings or transportation optimization 
software, and is taken into account in the above 
numbers. The shift to a low-carbon economy involves the 
development and deployment of these types of services, 
which may increase the lifetime of durable goods (cars, 
electrical appliances), as well as developing a functional 
economy that transfers the value added from the 
production of goods to the provision of a service. n
2.1.3 Investing more, and better, than today
The NCE Report estimates the required investment at $ 93  trillion between 2015 
and 2030. This sum does not take into account the necessary investments to 
adapt to the impacts of climate change. It comes at a time when the need to renew 
infrastructures is great in developed countries, and when the needs for new and 
significant infrastructures are even greater in emerging and developing countries. 
In addition, the incremental cost related to the inclusion of climate change in the 
projects only reaches 5% of total project cost, according to NCE, and this without 
taking into account the economic losses due to the consequences of climate change. 
It is therefore clear that moving beyond the consequences of the 2008 financial 
crisis requires a return to a higher rate of investment than today, especially in 
infrastructures. These investments are a prerequisite to development and to the 
financing thereof, given that the quality and availability of a country’s infrastructure 
are key parameters in an investor’s decision-making process. 
Therefore, the financing of a low-carbon roadmap requires both the increased 
availability of finance for infrastructure, and directing this finance towards low-
carbon, resilient investments.
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 Figure 6  Global investment requirements, 2015 to 2030, in $ trillion, constant 2010 dollars
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Waste and water 21,34 Urban water services and to a lesser extent rural water services
Energy –  
Transports engines 
Energy use
14,06
Power trains for fossil-fuel light-duty 
vehicles, as well as full vehicle costs of 
planes, ships and rails
Transport  
Rails, ports, airports
7,47 New construction as well as maintenance for rail, infrastructure requirements for 
airports and ports
Transport  
Road 6,2
Investment for new construction and 
maintenance
Energy – Oil and gas 11,55
Oil 7,14, Gas 4,41 
Oil includes upstream, refining and 
transport investment Gas includes 
upstream, transmission and distribution, 
and LNG investment
Energy – Power 
generation 5,78
Fossil-fuel power plants (oil, gas, 
coal-fuelled), renewables, nuclear, CCS 
and biofuels
Energy – Electricity T&D 4,32 Electricity T&D
Energie – Coal 0,97 Investment in coal mining
Energy – Buildings 
Energy use 5,83
Investments related to energy use  
in buildings eg ventilation  
and air conidtioning
Energy – Industry  
energy use 3,95
Investment related to energy use in the 
top five most energy intensive sectors: 
Chemicals and petrochemicals, iron 
and steel, pulp and paper, cement and 
aluminium
Telecoms 7,14
Fixed line telephony and data, mobile 
telephony and data including alternative 
wireless technologies beyond cellular mobile, 
and broadband mobile communications, 
especially wireless broadband
TOTAL 88,61
Reduced capex from 
fossil fuels -5,7
Reduced infrastructure spend 
on fossil fuel power plants and 
on the supply chain
Low carbon 
technology 4,7
Renewables including biofuels 
CCS and nuclear incremental 
deployment investment
Reduced electricity 
T&D costs -0,3
Energy efficiency savings 
outweigh increased demand 
from renewables
Infrastructure for 
energy efficiency 8,8
Buildings, industry, transport 
engines. Incremental investment 
needed to improve energy 
efficiency
Reduced capex from 
compact cities -3,4
Buildings, road, telecom water 
and waste, savings from a 
compact urban model
TOTAL 4,1
 Figure 7  Global infrastructure needs, 2015-2030 - $ trillion in 2010
CATEGORY CATEGORYOBJECT OBJECT$ $
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Source : UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, 2014
 Figure 8  Climate finance are estimated between $ 340 and $ 650 billion in 2014
 1. UNFCCC SCF (2014) Biennial 
Assessment and Overview of Climate 
Finance Flows, United Nations 
Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Standing 
Committee on Finance.
In 2014, the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) of the UNFCCC estimated 
the current volume of climate finance worldwide to be in the range of 340 to 
650 billion dollars. Within this amount, the flows from North to South countries 
are estimated in the range of 40 to 175 billion dollars of which public flows total 
between $35 to 50 billion. 1
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Investments in infrastructures Green infrastructures
 Figure 9  The share of green infrastructure investments  
is estimated in the range of 7 to 13% in 2013 1
 1. Total investments in green 
infrastructures ($350-$650 billion) 
comes from the SCF report:  
amount are derived from estimates  
by the NCE 2014 ($ 93 trillion from 
2015 to 2030, or an order of magnitude 
of $5 trillion dollars per year).
THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES
S ub-national and local authorities are worldwide on the frontline to feel the consequences of 
climate change. In California, Sao Paulo, or even the 
Indian States stricken with heat waves, local politicians 
are the first to deal with the short and long-term 
ramifications. Furthermore, they also hold key means 
of acting decisively, given that a significant share of the 
required investment to stay below 2°C is within their 
hands. While dependent on national legal frameworks, 
local authorities often have at least partial control 
of urban and transport planning, waste and water 
management, and in some cases public power utilities. 
They can also play a role in public procurement, notably 
through joint approaches to accelerate inclusion of 
low-carbon technologies and therefore offer large-scale 
opportunities for deployment for low-carbon products 
and materials. 
This aspect of the scaling up of climate finance is not 
considered in detail in the present report but deserves 
further consideration and a more detailed assessment, 
particularly around the following issues:
– How to ease access to capital markets for large 
metropolitan areas in developing countries?
– How to ease access for sub-national governments to 
international climate finance, particularly from the Green 
Climate Fund?
– How to better support and coordinate the emergence 
of “compact and sustainable cities” through investments 
and urban planning, in particular through the efforts of 
development bank and agencies? n
The absence of indicator aiming to measure the green share of infrastructure 
investments reveals the lack of markers providing a signal towards the financing of 
a low-carbon economy. For this reason, we propose that this indicator be part of the 
roadmap developed in this report (Section 3.1). 
Low Estimate High Estimate 
650 bn
5 trillion
340 bn
5 trillion
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 1. « We pledge to incorporate climate 
mitigation and resilience considerations 
into our development assistance 
and investment decisions.», 
G7 Declaration, June 2015.
2.2  ADAPTATION FINANCING NEEDS  
FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE COUNTRIES
2.2.1 Funding for adaptation: what does this imply?
Funding for adaptation to climate change is a global stake, but first and foremost, 
it is a priority for the poorest and most vulnerable countries. Yet, at present, funding 
dedicated to adaptation is not readily tracked. This is due principally to a lack of 
clear definitions. Thus, it is important to distinguish between two main categories: 
– firstly, funding for adaptation projects responding to the impacts of climate 
change, including for example, the construction of dykes to cope with sea-level rise; 
– secondly, the preventive integration of future climate impacts in development 
projects (construction of resilient infrastructure, methods of agricultural production, 
management of water resources, etc.).
These two categories imply different financial rationales.
In the first case, the goal is to build an infrastructure that responds to the existing 
and future impacts of climate change. There is no purely private business model 
for financing these projects, which generally falls in the category of public goods. 
Indeed, the dyke, to continue with this example, is funded either by the local or 
international taxpayers.
In the second case, the goal is to adjust a project that would have occurred in 
any case, given development needs and objectives. Adaptation funding is defined 
here as the incremental cost linked to project designs that improve resilience and 
overall resistance to the impacts of climate change, and not as the entire cost of the 
project. The evaluation of this incremental cost varies for each project and is difficult 
to express as an overall average. 
Nevertheless, the infrastructure investors interviewed for this report clearly argue 
that the earlier the resilience component is integrated into a project, the more efficient 
and less costly it is. It is therefore important for different stakeholders involved in 
development to commit to the systematic and upstream integration of adaptation to 
climate change. At the Summit for Peace and Security in Africa in December 2013, the 
French government declared that “France will ensure that all infrastructure financed 
projects in Africa will be resilient to the impacts of climate change starting from 2015.” 
In the same spirit, President Obama declared via an Executive Order released at 
the New York Climate Summit in September 2014 to integrate climate resilience in 
international programs and development investments financed by the United States. 
Unfortunately, these examples don’t stand as the general rule and this process of 
integration is far from broadly implemented - although it is the most effective way to 
address the consequences of climate change, including financial impacts. In June 
2015, the G7 countries pledged to “incorporate climate mitigation and resilience 
considerations into their development assistance and investment decisions”. This will 
certainly accelerate this current dynamic.
In addition, the integration of adaptation may not always lead to an increased 
incremental cost, but represent a change in practice that could be instead be 
revenue-generating and cost-saving. For instance, given increased water scarcity, 
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Share of the funding for  
adaptation going to LDCs
$ 8-10 bn
$ 4-5 bn
 1. CPI (2014) A Closer Look at Public 
Adaptation Finance, Climate Policy 
Initiative.; OECD (2013) Climate-Related 
Development Finance, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.; UNEP (2014) Adaptation 
gap report, United Nations Environment 
Program.; World Bank ( 2011) 
Economics of Adaptation to climate 
change, World Bank Group.
2. OECD, 2014.
 Figure 10   
Share of funding for adaptation 
from developed countries  
to LDCs in 2015
investments in water efficiency may well confirm their economic viability through 
reduced water consumption. 
In this context, the ongoing work by development banks to develop a common 
methodological approach to account adaptation, to be published in July 2015, is 
expected to improve the understanding and transparency of these financial flows. 
Despite these uncertainties, it is reasonable to estimate that the majority of financing 
for adaptation in the most vulnerable countries is public. The potential incremental cost 
linked to improving the resilience of a project is difficult to integrate into a profit-based 
business model, given that it rarely generates additional revenues. In the medium 
term, integrating resilience into infrastructures, even those financed by private sector, 
will progressively allow private economic models to better finance adaptation. 
2.2.2 Financing for adaptation: state of play 
Many reports provide estimates of the funding that is currently devoted to 
adaptation 1. Examples include: 
– The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) estimates that $ 25 billion of public funding was 
devoted to adaptation in 2013, of which $ 8 billion came from Northern development 
finance institutions.
– According to various analyses by the OECD, adaptation funding represented 
between $ 6.8 to $ 9.6 billion in 2013, of North to South flows. 
– According to the OECD, 45% of the funding for adaptation is devoted to 
low-income countries and to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 2. The LDCs are 
the most vulnerable countries given that that they are both highly exposed to the 
impacts of climate change and also dispose of few resources to improve resilience, 
including a lack of human and financial capital. 
It is important to recall that these analyses focus on figures from 2013, and thus do 
not integrate the finance devoted to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF should 
devote more than $ 1 billion per year for adaptation, without counting leverage, as 
set by its Board of Directors in the broad guidelines adopted in 2014. 
It is therefore possible to roughly estimate current adaptation funding of around 
$ 8 to 10 billion in 2015 ($ 7 to 9 billion plus $ 1 additional billion via the GCF in 2015 
and 2016). Furthermore, it can be estimated that in 2015 half of this, or $ 4 to 5 
billion, will be used to support adaptation in the most vulnerable countries. 
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 1. UNEP (2014) Adaptation Gap Report.
2. “We pledge to incorporate climate 
mitigation and resilience considerations 
into our development assistance and 
investment decisions.” 
G7, Declaration, June 2015.
3. Cat-DDO (Catastrophe Deferred 
Drawdown Option) is a credit line 
providing immediately liquidity to 
member countries of the IBRD (World 
Bank public credit) following a natural 
disaster. It is part of a broader range 
of risks financial instruments from the 
World Bank Group aiming to support 
borrowers to plan efficient responses to 
natural disasters.
4. Commitment taken by North 
countries in 1969 during a United 
Nations General Assembly to 
devote 0,7% of their GDP to official 
development assistance.
It is very difficult to assess global adaptation needs, given the weakness of 
current methodological approaches. Based on the census conducted by the 
World Bank and used by United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 1, the 
adaptation financing needs for LDCs are estimated at around $ 50 billion per year 
by 2025/2030. 
Although it is impossible to quantify the precise needs for adaptation, it is reasonable 
to assume that estimates will not decrease below tens of billions of dollars per year 
for the most vulnerable countries alone, even with refined methodologies. 
Our propositions for CoP21
Given the increasing impacts of climate change, it is reasonable to presume that 
adaptation financing needs are growing; this has also been suggested by the above 
mentioned work of UNEP. Nonetheless, considering the current methodological 
uncertainties in evaluating financing needs and incremental costs, it is difficult 
to define a new financial target. Thus, the systematic upstream integration of 
resilience can significantly reduce incremental costs. As such, CoP21 could 
lead to a political agreement in principle to set a target for 2020 and beyond, 
to provide public funding for adaptation for the most vulnerable countries. This 
should focus particularly on “LDCs, Small Island Developing States and Africa”, 
to use the terminology employed under the UNFCCC. To avoid a repeat of the 
extended methodological debate that followed the Copenhagen decision on the 
$ 100 billion, we encourage a purely public commitment to adaptation to facilitate 
traceability and using all available tools (grants, loans, loans/grants combined, 
guarantees, insurance, etc.). Nonetheless, this does not exclude measures 
targeting private financial flows to support the integration of resilience into their 
investment decisions. 
A set of commitments dedicated to the adaptation needs of the most vulnerable 
countries could therefore be structured around the following three elements:
–  The general decision of all donors and multilateral development institutions to 
integrate climate resilience by 2020. This should be done in coherence with 
the G7 declaration of June 2015 2 and the Sustainable Development Goals 
that make climate resilience a pillar of the development agenda in all relevant 
sectors (water, energy, agriculture, infrastructure…). 
–  The extension of existing programs to anticipate extreme weather events 
(disaster risks reduction programmes), support recovery and reconstruction 
after natural disasters (World Bank’s study on using Cat-DDO3) and to insure 
a higher number of people against the consequences of climate change – as 
the G7 countries committed in June to  do by “increasing by up to 400 million 
the number of people in the most vulnerable developing countries who have 
access to direct or indirect insurance coverage against the negative impact of 
climate change.”
–  Financial commitment to define a minimum target for public finance for 
adaptation in 2020 and beyond, dedicated to ‘LDCs, Small Island Developing 
States and Africa.’ 
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PROPOSITION TO ARTICULATE  
CLIMATE FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
T he 3rd Conference on Financing for Development, which will 
take place in July 2015 in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, will be the occasion 
for Northern donors to reaffirm their 
commitment to meet the 0,7% 4 
and on a specific objective for LDCs. 
This is a crucial step on the road to 
the Climate Conference in Paris in 
December 2015. 
The climate change agenda is in 
truth a development agenda, as it 
implies the increased financing for 
infrastructure that is a prerequisite to 
development. In addition, the LDCs are 
also the countries the most vulnerable 
to the negative impacts of climate 
change. Climate action, whether 
dedicated to adaptation or mitigation, 
is therefore a condition of these 
countries’ long-term development. 
Nonetheless, taking a short-term 
perspective, it is necessary to take 
into account two concerns raised by 
developing countries. First, that there 
is a risk of substitution, meaning, for 
example, that donors may finance 
fewer schools or hospitals in favor 
of more solar panels. Second, that 
there is a risk of limiting progress 
towards development objectives due 
to increased costs. For example, the 
increased cost of producing energy 
through clean sources may result in 
a slower rate of increase in access to 
that energy.
In order to clarify the issues at stake 
it is necessary to identify, within 
the finance for development, two 
categories of sector, distinguished by 
their relationship to climate change. 
The first category has a limited 
climate dimension and includes 
sectors such as education (in terms 
of service provided), governance, 
human rights, and capacity building. 
It is necessary here to distinguish 
the service provided from the 
infrastructure (schools, hospitals, 
etc.), which could be impacted by 
climate change. 
In the second category, with a more 
significant climate dimension, are 
included sectors such as energy and 
energy efficiency, cities, transports, 
agriculture, water, etc. These sectors 
have a direct, positive or negative 
impact on the climate, and are 
directly affected by it. 
It is thus possible to find a coherent 
articulation between climate finance 
and development finance using 
three typologies:
 1  When there is a natural 
convergence between development 
and climate – for example, better 
water management, agriculture and 
food security.
 2  When climate finance covers the 
incremental cost of sustainability. 
This, it is important to note that 
this incremental cost is not only 
decreasing, but is also increasingly 
small. For example, the construction 
of a wind farm rather than a coal-
fired power plant. 
 3  When climate finance covers the 
incremental cost of adaptation of a 
project for which there is no business 
model for private sector – such 
as the construction of a dyke. 
Furthermore, this could include 
integrating increased resilience into 
standard projects, in particular those 
related to infrastructure; for example, 
the construction of a resilient health 
center or school. 
This articulation can be illustrated 
using the following flowchart.
Therefore, addressing the tensions 
between climate finance and 
development finance is one of the 
most efficient means to ease the 
“mainstreaming” of climate change 
when it is necessary and consistent 
with the Sustainable Development 
Goals that will be adopted in 
September 2015. n
 Figure 10  Articulation of development finance  
and climate finance
Source : Canfin/Cristofari, 2015
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Dec. 2015Dec. 2004
EUR
Dec. 2009
 1. Robert Gordon (2014) The turtle’s 
progress : Secular stagnation meets 
the headwinds in Secular Stagnation : 
Facts, Causes, and Cures, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research
2. IMF (April 2015), 
World Economic Outlook.
3. At the end of 2014, the People’s 
Bank of China’s assets include 
approximately 80% of exchange 
reserves, the central bank buys dollars 
from foreign commercial flows and 
converts them in Yuan. In order to 
avoid the inflation that this action could 
generate, the People’s Bank of China 
imposes the countries’ banks legal a 
reserves rate of 18.5% (Bloomberg).
 Figure 12  The growth of central banks’ balance sheets since 2008
Source : CDC Climat Research after datas from European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, Bank of Japan, People’s Bank of China and ECB staff calculations.
2.3  THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT IS  
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR LOW-CARBON INVESTMENT
The current macroeconomic context is characterized by slowed economic 
growth, both in developed and developing countries. A number of factors have 
caused a slowdown of the capital stock increase: the risk of a ‘secular stagnation’ 1 
in developed countries, due to a potential growth that will increase at a lower rate 
than before the crisis; the predictable effects of demographic growth (population 
aging); and the long-lasting effects from the crisis2.
In response to the financial crisis, central banks of a number of high-income 
countries launched accommodative monetary policies with the double objective 
of heading off a collapse of the financial system, and stimulating economic growth 
through monetary means, in accordance with their mandate. 
The Bank of Japan expanded its monetary easing in October 2014, and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) launched an asset purchase program in January 
2015, which included the purchase of government bonds. The US Federal Reserve 
(FED) began reducing its quantitative easing program at the end of 2014. However, 
it continues to maintain its benchmark interest rates at very low levels. It has, 
however, been the People’s Bank of China that has increased its balance sheet at a 
faster pace than these other three Central Banks over the past few years. 3 
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 Figure 13  The triangle of paradoxes
Expansionary monetary policy
The needed investments 
in infrastructure  
are not met
Tension on  
investors’ long term  
economic models
Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015
1. NCE, 2014.
2. According to World Bank indicators, 
2010-2014.
3. NCE, 2014.
In developed countries, these policies are maintain interest rates on long-
term government bonds at a very low level, which reflect the forecast of actors 
anticipating low growth in their economic perspectives. In March 2015, a 30 years 
mortgage was priced at 4% in the United States, 2% in Italy, and less than 1% in 
Germany and Japan. 
With the notable exception of China, the global economic context is also marked by 
a deficit of long-term investment, particularly in terms of infrastructure. The NCE 1 has 
gone so far as to evoke a “broken infrastructure development model.” In Europe and 
the United States, the stock of infrastructure dating from the 1960’s is now aging and 
has been only partially renovated. In developing countries, the lack of infrastructure 
has often been and remains one of the major obstacles to private investment and 
development: the installed electricity output capacity of the emerging countries is 
only a fifth of that of developed countries, 25% of the inhabitants of India and 62% of 
the Nigerian population do not have access to electricity at all. 2 
Currently, the stock of infrastructure and associated assets does not grow quickly 
enough to meet the rising demands of institutional investors from developed 
countries, who manage pensions and savings funds. These investors control an 
estimated total pool of $ 90 trillion in assets and net annual investment flows of $ 5 to 
8 trillion 3. Of this, only $1 to 2 billion is currently invested in long-term infrastructure 
assets. The business model of institutional investors is increasingly strained, given 
low long-term interest rates and the growing needs of an ageing population. These 
institutions are actively advocating for increased infrastructure investment, and 
have communicated their readiness to invest massively in low-carbon infrastructure 
– provided the conditions of stable and long-term returns, which they require as part 
of their fiduciary duty, are met. 
A unique opportunity therefore arises from the convergence of three factors that 
support the financing a low-carbon economy.
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1.  IMF (2014) World Economic Outlook.
 2. The Equator Principles are principles 
used by major international banks 
to integrate social, societal and 
environmental factors within financing 
frameworks. These principles serve as 
a basis for a responsible finance and 
respect World Bank standards.
In October 2014, the IMF called for stimulation of the world’s economy by 
the launch of an infrastructure investment program. In a sample of high-income 
countries, an increase in investment by the equivalent of 1% of GDP is estimated 
to trigger a growth in output of 0.4% over the same year, and of 1.5% four 
years later1. The IMF has emphasized that the economic slowdown and the 
accommodative monetary policy are contributing to the maintenance of low 
interest rates, when they could otherwise increase due to the rise in investment. 
It is therefore crucial to incite the transition to a low-carbon economy before the 
inevitable increase in interest rates. 
The transition to a low-carbon economy is therefore an opportunity to scale 
up infrastructure deployment at a time when investors in both developed and 
developing countries need it, while the present low interest rates offer a window to 
finance this transition at a historically low cost. 
To conclude, the infrastructure necessary for the low-carbon economy transition 
is composed of real assets that are net creators of jobs. While the low-carbon 
transition does imply sectoral reallocation of jobs, it will nevertheless expand 
employment in construction, operation, and research and development related to 
the new, low-carbon technologies involved. Energy efficiency investments are also 
sources of increased productivity. In the current context of weak economic growth 
in most developed countries, the transition towards a low-carbon economy is not 
only a powerful means of protecting society from the threat of climate change, but 
also a means to create jobs. 
2.4  THE ROLE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRY CAPITAL  
IN FINANCING LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Given the large scale of investment needs in the developing world, most of the 
finance necessary for the low-carbon transition will come from domestic sources 
within developing countries. In many developing countries, domestic savings 
do not find sufficient opportunities for local investment, particularly over long 
maturities. Therefore part of this capital is currently invested in the financial markets 
of developed countries.
A number of initiatives are arising, notably in China, to structure green investment 
funds to provide investment in the region (e.g. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
the New Development Bank, Silk Road Fund). The joint report of UNEP-FI and the 
People’s Bank of China, released in May of 2015, indicates that these funds aim to 
apply the Ecuador Principles 2 to their investments in the region. This is an important 
step to avoid the danger of having a two-tier framework of environmental standards 
in emerging economy countries. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
T he present report focuses on North-South financial flows; an 
analysis of the role of the development 
of South-South cooperation is beyond 
its scope. Nonetheless, it should be 
mentioned, for example, that the New 
Development Bank (NDB) will normally 
have a total capital of $ 50 billion, 
including 20% callable capital. The 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) should possess a total initial 
capital of $ 100 billion, including 20% 
callable capital. The Silk Road Fund 
was endowed of $ 40 billion. 
Based from these data and, building 
on the experience of other Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs), it is 
possible to roughly estimate that 
the NDB’s portfolio could reach an 
amount of about $ 50 billion in the 
medium term, whereas the activities 
of AIIB could reach $ 100 billion. These 
banks will necessarily intervene in 
infrastructure financing, in relation to 
the climate agenda, whether it is for 
mitigation or adaptation.n
 1. Private Participation in Infrastructure 
Research Group, (2013),  
UNEP & BNEF, (2013).
2.  Vivid Economics (2014) Financing 
Green Growth.
3. NCE (2014) Better Growth,  
Better Climate.
The majority of current private sector climate finance for developing countries 
currently flows to three countries: Brazil, India and China. 1 The private sector is 
proportionally more involved in providing climate finance in developed countries 
(88%) than in the developing world (57%). The repartition of these private climate 
flows is as follows: developers of small- and middle-size renewable energy projects 
50%; industrial companies 30%, banks 20% while institutional investors only 
financed less than 1%. 2
This high share of renewable energy projects can be linked to the fact that many 
of them are relatively stand-alone, supplying power directly to one or more end 
users, sometimes off-grid. Financially, related project risk is reduced by a number 
of factors, for example: the relatively small project size in comparison to large-scale 
infrastructure; the involvement of export credit agencies in financing equipment; 
relatively short construction periods; and improved returns due to the spectacular 
decrease in equipment and production costs3. However, the small size of project 
sponsors and their respective balance sheets, combined with the required rapid 
return on invested capital, prevents them from investing in larger-scale infrastructure, 
such as transport networks for electricity, water or data. 
Institutional investors in developed countries possess vast sums of capital, 
and have indicated their willingness (for both financial and reputational reasons) 
to finance low-carbon infrastructures in the developing world. At present they 
have begun to do so in a limited fashion. However, their role could be crucial for 
the transition:
– Public capital could contribute to the development of local financial markets, 
and to the emergence of low-carbon projects via the provision of guarantees for 
select risks (see Section 3.5.3). 
MOBILIZING CLIMATE FINANCE - A ROADMAP TO FINANCE A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY_36_
– Institutional investors are able to offer long maturities, when the maximum tenor 
for infrastructure financing currently available is 10 years. This even in China, which 
has one of the most developed financial markets among emerging economies. 
The issue of finance maturity and tenors is key. Indeed, the profitability of an 
infrastructure investment is highly dependent on the duration of the financing. As 
initial investment costs increase, longer depreciation and financing timespans are 
necessary so that the cost may be spread over time.  Most infrastructure investments 
cannot generate profits over short time periods. Yet, the duration of concessions 
and depreciation depends not only on legal and accounting frameworks in the 
country, but also on the tenor of the financing available. If financing is only available 
for a tenor shorter than the depreciation (for example a 10 year tenor for a metro 
project amortized over 30 years), there is a risk that the project will not be able 
in year 11 to refinance at an acceptable adequate cost (refinancing risk). Most of 
the borrowers refuse this level of risk and therefore the project will not be able to 
procure funding from the beginning. 
Given the lack of domestic financial markets offering long maturities, many 
developing countries can only finance infrastructure out of public budgets, which 
are often constrained by high levels of existing debt. The energy transition can thus 
also be an opportunity to foster the development of longer maturities in domestic 
financial markets, which is in itself a part of broader development objectives (including 
domestic savings and tax collection). Developed countries can play an important 
role in assisting developing countries, notably via Development Banks. These can 
both provide financing and foster the development of long-term infrastructure 
projects. This in turn can create benchmarks for the domestic financial markets, 
enabling newly developed markets to better retain and manage domestic savings.
_37_MOBILIZING CLIMATE FINANCE - A ROADMAP TO FINANCE A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
2.5 IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO BETTER OVERCOME THEM
2.5.1 The over-arching barriers to private sector involvement  
in low-carbon investment
In order to identify those measures with the highest potential impact, it is 
important to first identify the obstacles to the inflow of capital from the global North, 
particularly the large sums managed by institutional investors, aimed at financing 
the low-carbon transition in the global South.
The first barrier is conceptual in nature. For most investors in developed countries, 
climate finance is principally equated with financing of renewable energy. While 
renewables are an important component, the transition to a low-carbon economy 
also requires massive investment in urban development, public transport, energy 
efficiency, waste and water facilities – sectors to date poorly identified as opportunities 
by investors. This is thus one of the reasons why the introduction of labels and 
standards for the financial sectors to identify green investments is a priority. 
As such, the limitations to leveraging financing from the North to support low-
carbon investment in developing countries reveal many of the broader difficulties 
that all infrastructure projects in these countries face. There are nevertheless a 
number of obstacles specific to the low-carbon transition:
– A higher dependency on a stable, long-term regulatory environment  : i.e. the 
use of feed-in tariffs and other support mechanisms that must be perceived as 
established credibly  over long periods of time;
– The necessity for governments to establish credible and reliable regulatory 
frameworks, as well as to act as creditworthy counterparties in both public sector 
projects and private sector projects involving a public utility;
– Low-carbon technologies (e.g. energy efficiency, transport, etc.), for which 
information on investment costs and future performance is relatively scarce. 
Furthermore, these technologies often fall outside existing asset classes with 
proven track records that facilitate institutional investor participation;
– Transversal and systemic nature of changes needed for low-carbon development: 
in the case of transportation, the development of a low-carbon fleet of vehicles, 
new engines and the production and supply of low-carbon fuels need to occur 
in parallel.  Facilitating the development of “compact cities” requires integrated 
upstream planning and technical engineering; for instance, low-carbon and 
resiliency requirements must be integrated at the design stages for roads, 
buildings, transport systems, etc. Yet, many planning bodies for urban areas 
in emerging and developing countries do not have the capacity to enact the 
upstream integration of climate-related issues. This is principally a challenge to 
be overcome by national and sub-national governments, however development 
finance institutions can also play a role.
 To demonstrate a number of the other barriers to private sector investment, 
Box 6 presents the obstacles identified by the Private Sector Facility of the 
Green Climate Fund. 
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BARRIERS TO PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT 
IN LOW-CARBON INVESTMENT, ACCORDING TO 
THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND (2013)
 A Higher up-front costs: Most climate-related investments impose higher up-
front costs. This is true for projects that help abate carbon as well as projects that 
raise adaptive capacity. Even where an analysis of life-cycle costing shows that 
the costs are similar to, or less than, the costs associated with current alternatives 
over the life of a project, commercial interest is often dampened due to the longer 
pay-back periods and therefore the lower immediate return.
 B Greater technological risks, especially under local conditions: Most 
climate-related technologies have not penetrated local developing country 
markets. The technological risks in private investment can therefore be high.
 C Limited relevant expertise/capacity among the actors involved in 
delivering climate actions: A lack of capacity and expertise can be seen in every 
element of the value chain of investments designed to address climate change, 
and extends to relevant financing, regulatory and governance institutions.
 D Nascent stage of climate-related technologies: The supply chain for most 
climate-related technologies is in an emerging state and thus underdeveloped 
in most countries. The lack of scale and mature ecosystem of players along all 
relevant segments of the value chain of climate-related investments increases 
transaction costs and dents the confidence of potential private investors. This is 
aggravated by an absence of transparency as evidenced by the lack of strong 
regional aggregators along the value chain.
 E Lack of awareness: Industry, especially micro, small and medium industries, 
and also consumers and communities are often unaware of options for addressing 
climate change. This lack of awareness also extends to municipal and local bodies, 
financial and regulatory bodies and local governance institutions.
 F Limited capital market instruments: Due to underdeveloped capital 
markets, financial instruments that correctly price risk are either unavailable or 
unaffordable. 
 G Third party risks: Many local and foreign investors perceive foreign exchange 
availability, regulatory uncertainty and the risk of default by local institutions (such 
as energy and water utilities) in honoring their obligations as major impediments 
to private investment in general and costlier climate investments in particular. 
 H Absence of adequate local institutional capacity: In many developing 
countries, local institutions that can lead the fight against climate change are 
either absent or, when present, lack the required technical and financial capacity 
to make a difference.  n
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 Figure 14  Every 1% increase in the required rate of return  
increases capital costs by $ 40 billion per year 
Source : Vivid Economics 2014.
2.5.2 Improving the risk/return profile of investments
Institutional investors in high-income countries have a fiduciary duty vis-à-vis 
their clients who have entrusted them with the management of their capital. They 
are therefore obliged to invest prudently to respect this duty. Given the low level of 
interest rates in high-income countries, several institutional investors auditioned 
by the present Commission expressed their interest in the opportunity to invest in 
low-carbon assets in developing countries – even with a relatively low multi-sector 
average of returns of 2 to 4%. These investors are currently not deterred by the 
modest returns of low-carbon investment in developing countries, but rather by 
what they perceive as high risks. These include political, institutional and regulatory 
instability; technological risk; and country exposure to other external factors. In 
order to cover those perceived risks, an infrastructure project in the developing 
world must often generate a higher return than it would in a developed economy. 
This is a critical barrier to development. 
Some of the measures recommended in this report aim to lower the perceived 
risks associated with investments supporting the low-carbon transition; and 
therefore aim to reduce the cost of financing – with an expected effect on the cost 
of the transition itself. 
It is essential to note that a decrease of a single percent in the required rate 
of return by investors could represent at the scale of the transition a decrease in 
capital repayment costs of around $ 40 billion per year in 2030 (see Figure 14). 
Note : Assumes all mitigation investments are written down overs 20 years 
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THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR AN INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECT COMPANY - AND HOW IT CAN BE LOWERED
A project company is an ad hoc private company, created 
specifically to house and finance an infrastructure project. 
The project is ‘ring fenced’ from the balance sheet of both 
the private sponsor (company) and the public sector (local 
authority, State, etc.).
1. The discount rate and the rate  
of return of an investment project
Discount rates play a key role in the calculations 
investors make to estimate the Net Present Value of 
future cash flows. For example, the present value of a 
cash flow of € 110 received one year from now is € 100 
using a  the discount rate of 10%. It is € 103 with a 7% 
discount rate, and € 96 with a 15% discount rate. 
A high discount rate will make near-term cash flows 
relatively more important than later cash flows in 
the present value calculation and therefore prevents 
the prioritization of longer-term concerns, whether 
positive or negative. 
In other temrs, an investment in an infrastructure project 
implies an initial expenditure in the year N and creates 
revenues in the years N+1, N+2 etc. The methodology 
presented here assumes that the project is housed in a 
dedicated Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and is only applied 
to cash flows, as only these can be discounted. A social 
cost of carbon, for instance, cannot be discounted using the 
same methodology as its future value is not dependent on 
the capital remuneration rates available in the market.  
The present value of future cash flows is the sum of future 
cash flows of each year, at the chosen discount rate. 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is the rate that equalizes 
present value of future cash flows and initial investment. 
2. Financing an investment project
An investment project will be financed by private investors 
only when the profitability of the project, or the IRR, is 
positive, and considered sufficient when set against 
internal benchmarks. At the time of the investment 
decision, both equity and debt investors use discount rates 
to compare future cash flows of projects to investment 
costs. The discount rate 1 is adjusted to include all 
perceived risks associated with the cash flows. 
In practice, the use of this rate can be simplified in the 
following manner:
 Figure 15  A project company financing model 
Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015
 1. According to the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) formula, 
established by Modigliani and Miller in 
1963 and universally accepted. 
It is therefore key to reduce the cost of the capital that will finance the transition 
to a low-carbon economy. The following box presents three of the principal 
components of the cost of capital for infrastructure projects that are covered in 
more detail in Section 3 of this report.
Project company
Asset
Equity
Debt
Return on assets
Weighted average 
cost of capital 
Discount rate
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The project is structured by its initial shareholders 
(sponsors): they structure the necessary contracts 
(duration, product sale price, etc. ) so as to be in a 
position to offer lenders an acceptable level of risk at 
an acceptable price for themselves. Whether debt is 
structured as a bank loan or as a bond issuance), lenders 
typically will not accept certain risks (e.g. construction 
risks); they will require that a third creditworthy 
party (such as the construction company) provide a 
guarantee. For the residual risks that they will accept, 
the lenders will charge a price premium. This cost will 
reflect the premium commensurate with their perceived 
exposure to residual risks: i.e. revenue risk, country risk, 
technological risk, etc. This premium is added to the 
non-risk weighted cost of funding. 
The return for the shareholders is dependent on the 
difference between the discounted project revenues and 
the cost of debt. This is therefore negotiated between 
shareholders and lenders. If lenders price debt is too 
high given the perceived project risks, shareholders may 
consider the returns on their capital insufficient. In the 
end, the global cost of capital for the project (or Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital) is the average between the 
required rate of return by shareholders and the cost of 
debt. In economic terms, the cost of capital must be 
kept below the returns from project assets (or Return on 
Capital Employed). When it is not possible to optimize the 
project risk-sharing structure to this effect, the project 
cannot be financed by private actors.
As a general rule, equity investors in a private project 
require returns on capital in the order of 15% to 20% 
per year. The lending rates for infrastructure projects are 
typically below 5% per year. If the project is financed 
with 20% equity (with an expected 20% return) and 80% 
in debt (with an interest rate of 5%), the average cost of 
capital is 8%. In this example, the project must therefore 
deliver returns of at least 8% per year. This level of 
returns is out of reach for many low-carbon projects, 
whose socio-economic benefits are not included in the 
above financial calculations. However, the earnings 
expectations of both lenders and shareholders are highly 
dependent upon the structure of the SPV contracts. 
External guarantees (whether from a contractor, from a 
third-party for revenues, or from the Government in the 
case of revenues of a Public Private Partnership), can 
drastically reduce the expected risk-weighted returns 
of all parties. Moreover, the cost of borrowing may be 
reduced by external factors (credit enhancement by an 
insurance company for instance), or by internal factors 
linked to project structuring (subordinated debt or a first 
loss guarantee). Finally, the project lifetime and the tenor 
debt of financing directly influences the length of time 
over which the initial investment can be amortized. This 
is a key issue which can render an infrastructure project 
financially feasible when annual revenues must be 
relatively low in order to be acceptable for the end user 
and/or the tax payer.
The risk-sharing structure of the project involving all 
parties, as well as the support of the public sphere 
(from both developed and developing countries), are key 
elements that make an infrastructure project possible 
financially feasible. 
3. How to lower the cost of capital of low-carbon 
infrastructure projects
The following factors linked to project structuring can 
contribute to reducing the cost of capital of a low-carbon 
infrastructure project: 
– Increase the project duration and amortization length: 
included in both the call for tenders, availability of 
finance with long maturity and tenors.
– Subsidies and/or tailored feed-in tariff support 
schemes.
– Creditworthy third party guarantees (governmental, 
constructor).
– Reducing risk for lenders through internal risk-
sharing agreements and tools (subordinated debt, 
third party guarantees, political risk guarantees, credit 
enhancement).
– Concessional or low-interest rate loans.
– Make visible the expected impacts due to climate 
change on infrastructures in order to value those that are 
resilient to these impacts, and allow them to benefit from 
a lower risk premium. 
All of these options are more readily available 
through the inclusion of development finance 
institution in the project. n
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HEDGING TRANSFER RISK
T ransfer risk is generally hedged, for lenders banks, by Multilateral 
Development Banks via an intervention 
structure called ‘A Loan/B Loan.’ For 
example, the credit, allocated to a steel 
mill in Kazakhstan totals $ 600 million. 
The MDB structures and syndicate the 
loan: it takes a share, referred as ‘A,’ of $ 
100 million for example, and syndicates 
$ 500 million to Northern commercial 
banks that provide the loan for a share 
referred as ‘B.’ The transfer risk from 
lenders of the ‘B’ share is hedged by 
the MDB: if financial flows from the loan 
cannot be transferred into the desired 
currency because the Central Bank of 
Kazakhstan cannot honor the transfer 
of these flows, borrowers are repaid by 
the MDB. The latter will then request the 
transfer of all financial flows into local 
currency (its own ‘A share’ and the flows 
of the ‘B share’) to the country as part 
of its ‘Preferred Creditor Status’ in the 
developing country. In other words, it 
means that the MDB, and its claims, has 
priority status in developing country, and 
thus will be prioritized when the Central 
Bank reopens exchange, or during 
negotiations of the debt restructuration if 
the situation remains blocked. 
Hedging transfer risk is essential 
for commercial banks of developed 
countries so they can accept to 
intervene in a financing a project in 
developing countries. This risk may 
be deemed as low if the country 
possesses significant developed country 
currencies in its reserves. In order to 
offer this type of loan structure, an 
MDB must possess have, owing to the 
agreements that is has with the project 
host country, a ‘Preferred Creditor 
Status.’ Members of the ‘MDBs Club’ 
(World Bank, International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), African Development 
Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), European Investment Bank (EIB), 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development(EBRD)) already have 
this status with the countries they 
intervene in. This status allows them to 
attract financial actors from developed 
countries to investment projects in the 
developing world. n
 1. On 30 September 2013 these 
currencies were : Australia Dollar, 
Bahrain Dinar, Canada Dollar, Denmark 
Krone, Euro,  Hong Kong Dollar, Kenya 
Shilling, Kuwait Dinar, New Zealand 
Dollar, Norway Krone, United Kingdom 
Pound, Singapore Dollar, South Africa 
Rand, Saudi Arabia Riyal, Sweden 
Krone, Switzerland Franc, United Arab 
Emirates Dirham, United States Dollar.
2.5.3 The high level of transfer risk for many  
developing countries’ currencies 
When investors from the North invest equity (stocks) or debt in a project in the South 
– whether public or private, they are repaid in the local currency. They must convert 
this local currency back into their original currency to recover their investment. At 
present, only 18 currencies in the world are freely convertible 1. The conversion of all 
other currencies to a developed country’s currency must be submitted for approval to 
the applicable national or currency-zone Central Bank. This Central Bank could decide 
to block the transfer, either for lack of available currency or for other motives. This 
risk is referred to as “transfer risk”. Transfer risk should not be confused with foreign 
exchange risk, i.e. the risk of a variation in the respective value of two currencies. In 
most cases, foreign exchange risk can be hedged by commercial banks.
2.5.4 The challenge of transforming needs into bankable projects
In the barriers mentioned so far, there is the assumption that project are available to 
finance, whether a low-carbon power plant, or a public transport network. However, 
the experts auditioned for this report pointed out the lack of projects in developing 
countries in general, and in particular those aligned with a low-carbon transition. 
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 Figure 16  Gaps in the types of support provided to improve access to finance
Source : Canfin/Grandjean after Vivid Economics, 2014
In both developed and developing countries, project developers need to shoulder 
the following costs  in order to transform a low carbon equipment need into a 
bankable project: 
– Costs of technical feasibility  studies: initial cost evaluation, construction, 
physical and/or geological surveys, traffic or market study, environmental impacts 
survey, etc.
– Costs of legal feasibility studies: cost and delay of licenses, permits, ownership 
rights, etc.
– Costs of financial feasibility  studies: selecting between public-led or private-
led projects, bidding procedures, the potential role for development banks, tax 
structure, etc.
Such project development costs represent significant amounts of money and time. 
Project developers can be industrial groups interested in technology dissemination 
or in developing new markets. They can also be investment funds interested in 
infrastructure equity. They are highly specialized in specific industrial sectors and 
often team up with industrial sponsors. The business model sufficient to cover these 
development cost relies on a larger portfolio of projects:  returns from successful 
projects must not only cover their own costs, but also the development costs 
of failed projects. This business model generates, a de facto, barrier to entry in 
new sectors, such as low-carbon investment, where technology and the financial 
environment are still new and comparatively uncertain. Furthermore, this model 
acts as an incentive for larger projects, in which the high entry costs are more easily 
covered if the project succeeds.  With the exception of renewable energy, smaller 
projects currently remain outside the scope of most development finance, whilst 
in developing countries, where basic infrastructure is often lacking, small projects 
could present opportunities for both job creation and development. 
The following chart summarizes the key obstacles to financing of projects coherent 
with the low-carbon transition. 
Phase in 
project cycle
Key barriers
Potential  
instruments
Early  
stage project  
development
Shortage  
of capacity
Concesionnal debt  
can play a key role
Shortage  
of equity
Liquidity  
is a key concern 
Equity investment  
in early stage of  
project development
Policy risk insurance
Credit scale up, including subordinated  
debt and first rank loss guarantees
Reglulatory and policy  
risks stay unsolved
Construction Operation Exit

3. THE ROADMAP TO FINANCE  
A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
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3.1 10 KEY PROPOSALS
3. THE ROADMAP TO FINANCE  
A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 
 1 Establish a monitoring process for the low-carbon financial roadmap to ensure its 
longevity beyond CoP21. The IMF and the World Bank could be charged with the supervision 
and implementation of this roadmap, in coordination with the institutions deemed relevant to 
perform this task, particularly within UNFCCC. The objective will be to monitor, in particular, 
the development of the carbon price signal (including phasing out fossil fuel subsidies), the 
reforms allowing the removal of barriers to investment in low-carbon infrastructure, the 
‘2°C roadmaps’ of development banks, the integration of climate risk in financial regulation, 
the relative volume of ‘green’ investments compared with total global investments in 
infrastructure and the evolution in the decoupling of GDP and greenhouse gas emissions. n
 3 Integrate climate in macro-economic models. The integration of a 2°C scenario throughout 
the macroeconomic forecasts and models of international institutions (IMF, OECD, etc.) and finance 
ministries in order to ensure a better coherence between short-term analysis and forecasts, and 
long-term low-carbon objectives. Any model or forecast, for example energy market forecasts, that 
is incompatible with the 2°C limit should be explicitly identified as such. n
 2 Establish a carbon price signal. A voluntary commitment from developed and emerging 
countries to put an explicit carbon price signal into effect, between a minimum target price 
of 15 to 20 dollars/ton of CO2 in 2020, and a maximum target price of 60 to 80 dollars/ton of 
CO2 in 2030/2035, according to levels of development.  n
 5 Request that each development bank to develop a ‘2°C investment roadmap’ 
compatible with the 2°C limit. This roadmap should specify how the development banks 
intends to contribute to the fulfillment of the 2°C limit agreed to by the international 
community. A joint monitoring process by multilateral, regional and bilateral development 
banks could be established, with a public report presented every two years during General 
Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. n
 4 Development of national strategies to finance the decarbonization of the economies.  
Governments, beginning with developed countries, should produce national decarbonization 
strategies for their economies, covering the needed financing, both public and private. France 
has adopted the principal of such a strategy in its law on the energy transition for green 
growth; the G7 countries also committed to this principal in June 2015. Among the key 
indicators for such strategies could be the relative volume of ‘green’ investments compared 
with total global investments made each year, combined with annual targets. France could 
propose to that IMF and the World Bank monitor this indicator, country by country, and to 
aggregate investment levels at the global level. n
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1. OECD Key partners are  
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia  
and South Africa.
 6 Increase the use by development banks of instruments and tools with high leverage 
ratios, such as guarantees, subordinated debt or credit enhancement, to increase climate 
finance at comparatively low costs. France could request development banks to estimate their 
capacity to mobilize additional climate finance through an increased use of these tools.
In the particular case of France, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) is today the only 
international development finance institution subject to Basel 3 prudential regulation. According 
to our estimations, if aligned with the prudential frameworks used by other development banks, 
the AFD could increase its activity by  € 1 to 2 billion. n
 10 Adopt the methodology developed by the OECD in June 2015 to analyze the 
alignment of public policies with low-carbon development. This is a key means of assessing 
the integration of progressive decarbonization targets in all public policies. We propose that 
France be part of the first countries to commit to apply this framework internally and urge other 
member countries of the OECD and OECD key partners 1 to do so before the CoP21. 
In the particular case of the European Union (EU), the financing of the Juncker Plan totaling 
€ 315 billion could be made conditional on climate co-benefits criteria and projects related 
to the implementation of the low-carbon transition could be prioritized (energy efficiency and 
technology projects). France could communicate broadly on its recent legislative developments 
to integrate climate issues into financial regulation. The French government could propose to 
its European partners to move forward in this direction. France could therefore request that the 
European Commission addresses this issue and proposes a plan of action for the next 2 to 3 
years to be delivered ahead of CoP21. n
 8 Request that the Bank for International Settlements (Basel Committee) define methods 
to include climate risks in stress tests for banks and insurance companies. This should 
include methodologies to assess the performance of assets held by banks and insurance 
companies in the +4°C scenario as developed by the International Panel of experts on Climate 
Change (IPCC). France, in partnership with other countries, could formally request the Basel 
Committee on this issue. n
 7 Include in the 2016 G20 work program the forthcoming recommendations of the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), which was mandated in April 2015 by G20 finance ministries 
to analyze the potential impacts of climate change on financial stability. n
 9 Establish a public monitoring system for financial actors’ engagements that have 
multiplied in recent months, including: the integration of climate risk; measuring greenhouse 
gas emissions induced by their financial activities; and increasing financing for the green 
economy. The UNFCCC’s Nazca Platform, which centralizes these commitments, can be used 
and further developed by CoP21 in order to increase the visibility of progress in this area 
within the broader ‘Agenda of Solutions.’ These commitments could be comprised in an 
annual public report.
In the particular case of France, the recently voted provisions of the energy transition for green 
growth legislation require institutional investors to measure the greenhouse gas emissions 
linked to their financial activities and to explain how they address the 2°C scenario. These same 
provisions could be usefully extended to private banks concerning their lending activities. n
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Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015
 Figure 17  The four dimensions of a low-carbon financial roadmap
Carbon price signal
Mobilising development  
banks towards more  
low-carbon projects
Low-carbon  
and resilient infrastructures
Financial regulation  
and mobilization of private  
financial actors 
Financing a  
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 1. UNEP Inquiry (2015) 
The coming financial climate.
WHY DOES THIS MATTER TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
Developing countries remain largely outside of existing international private capital 
flows. The reallocation of these flows is therefore principally an issue for developed 
and emerging countries. Nevertheless, the proposed agenda to reorient private capital 
flows holds significant benefits for developing countries.
1. Firstly, mitigation action and the achievement – or not –of the 2°C limit 
by developed and emerging countries will have direct consequences on the 
most vulnerable countries. The sooner investment flows are ‘greened,’ the 
less severe the impacts from climate change will be.
2. An increasing number of African countries are seeing the development 
of domestic capital markets (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia). These countries 
will benefit from the work realised to integrate climate issues into market 
regulation, both in terms of information systems and risk management..
3. The additional mobilization of risk hedging tools by development banks 
will allow private investors to invest more easily in countries that they do not 
consider today as part of their investment universe.
4. Developing and emerging countries host many of the central banks that are 
the most active in channelling domestic financial flows towards green projects. 
Bangladesh is a striking example, as well as Brazil, China, Indonesia. 1 This is 
thus not only an issue on the ‘Northern political agenda,’ but on the contrary, 
a common concern that has already found concrete translation in the global 
South; at least as much as in the North. This increases the potential of 
international cooperation on the matter. 
This report provides, apparently for the first time, a roadmap to finance a low-carbon 
economy that comprehensively deals with four fundamental dimensions: carbon 
price signal, low-carbon and resilient infrastructures, development banks, financial 
regulation and mobilisation of private financial actors.
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Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015
 Figure 18  Different methods of putting a price on carbon
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1. https://www.unglobalcompact.org
2.  Carbon pricing leadership coalition : 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/
programs/pricing-carbon#2
3.  IMF (2014) How Much Carbon 
Pricing is in Countries’ Own Interests? 
The Critical Role of Co-Benefits, 
International Monetary Fund.
4.  List of companies supporting a 
carbon price through the UN Global 
Compact and World Bank Initiative: 
http://wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/
content/put-price-carbon
5. Declaration on Business proposals 
in view of a 2015 international climate 
change agreement at COP 21 in Paris, 
May 2015.
6. The Guardian (2015) Europe’s energy 
big six say gas must help in the fight 
against climate change, 01/06/2015; 
Press release by Total: http://www.total.
com/en/media/news/press-releases/oil-
and-gas-majors-call-carbon-pricing
3.2 THE CARBON PRICE SIGNAL
Including the cost of climate change – considered as a negative externality – in the 
price of goods and services is one of the principal means of incentivizing markets, 
companies and consumers to support a low-carbon economy. This can be done by 
putting a price on carbon; which can occur concretely – depending on political choices 
and local regulations – through carbon markets, taxes and charges, the implementation 
of emission norms and standards, the use of a shadow or social cost of carbon (for 
public investments or development banks), among other measures.
The importance of putting a price on carbon has gathered a large consensus. This 
includes not only academic literature, but also numerous international institutions such 
as the United Nations Global Compact 1, the World Bank 2, and the IMF 3,among others. 
Furthermore, an increasing number of companies are also in favor of a carbon price. 
This has been clearly demonstrated by the large number of signatories to the call for 
action launched in September 2014 in New York4; the declaration of the Business 
and Climate Summit 5, which has been signed by more than 6 million companies; or 
most recently by the request of six oil and gas majors for the introduction of a price 
on carbon 6. According to the Global Commission on the New Climate Economy, 
around 12% of global CO2 emissions are currently covered by a carbon price. Today, 
40 countries have put into place a tax or a carbon market. These include multiple Latin 
American countries such as Mexico and Chile, but also Japan and eventually South 
Africa. In China, an emissions trading scheme has been tested in 7 provinces and will 
be extended nationally from 2016. Furthermore, 73 countries along with 11 sub-national 
states and provinces – responsible altogether for more than half of global carbon 
emissions – officially announced their support for the adoption of a carbon price during 
the Ban Ki Moon Summit in 2014. However, the progress made on the introduction of a 
price on carbon remains inadequate for widespread changes in investment decisions. 
We make the following proposals.
3.2.1 Establishing a ‘carbon price corridor’
 A first-best option would be to set a single, global price on carbon. However, it is 
necessary for this price to take into account the levels of development of different 
countries, as well as the significant variation in price levels necessary to shift investments 
and economic models in different sectors. Furthermore, the implementation of a 
carbon price can be achieved using a variety of tools, as illustrated in Figure 18. 
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This proposition aims to fulfil several objectives:
– Many countries have introduced a carbon price signal without sending a clear 
message at the international level to economic decision markers. Establishing this 
voluntary corridor or target would send a common and clear political message, 
when linked with CoP21. This would send a clear and credible signal on the 
forwarding looking growth of the price on carbon, which is an essential expectation 
of economic actors.
– This corridor would aim for a price consistent with levels judged pertinent by 
studies on the impact of carbon pricing on investment decisions; such as the work 
by McKinsey, released in 20091. Committing to a minimum carbon price would 
ensure the improved efficiency of the scheme; a maximum carbon price provides 
important information to economic actors. 
– It combines the strength of a common political message and the necessary 
flexibility to differentiate between countries and geographical zones, both in terms of 
price level and time horizon, to better take into account different levels of development. 
– It also allows every country or geographical zone to choose the most suitable 
fiscal or regulatory instrument for its respective context. 
– The target price aimed for here is an ‘explicit’ price signal - translated by a tax 
or via a  cap-and-trade system. Various studies 2 have demonstrated that it would 
be desirable in the coming decades for this price to reach an amount between 100 
to 300 dollars per ton of CO2. In many cases, it appears preferable to complement 
a lower explicit carbon price (whether through a tax or quotas) with an indirect price 
signal via norms or standards. The combination of both tools would result de facto 
in a higher price than the explicit signal alone. 
Source : Canfin/Grandjean, after We Mean Business, 2015
 Figure 19  A carbon price “corridor”
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Finally, the introduction of sectoral and geographical flexibility improves the 
political economy of such a reform. As such, we propose establishing a “carbon 
corridor” or a “carbon target”, independent of the international agreement of the 
Climate Convention. This “carbon corridor” would be implemented by developed 
and emerging countries on a voluntary basis, and include a minimum target price of 
15 to 20 dollars/ton of CO2 in 2020, and a maximum target price of 60 to 80 dollars/
ton of CO2 in 2030/2035. 
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The countries that choose to enact this carbon corridor would commit to ensuring 
the implementation of these initiatives to create a carbon price signal . The work of 
the OECD1 on explicit carbon pricing, conducted to date on 15 countries, as well 
as the studies of the World Bank, could serve as a relevant base of information and 
pertinent analysis to monitor commitments. 
The decision to create a carbon corridor is likely to be made outside of the formal 
international climate agreement, given that this process requires international 
consensus. Governments willing to go further can form a voluntary ‘club’ that will 
be able to grow over time. This club could then ensure the reporting of progress on 
the implementation of these commitments to the Climate Convention. 
3.2.2 Redirecting fossil fuels subsidies
Although addressing climate change implies massively reducing dependency 
on fossil fuels, which are responsible for more than 80% of global CO2 emissions, 
this sector continues to be heavily supported by both production and consumption 
subsidies. This continues irrespective of the G20 and the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) establishment in 2009 of a peer-review system of these 
support or subsidies.
Subsidies to production are even more worrying that those supporting consumption 
as they incentivize both long-term investments and lock-in into a trajectory 
incompatible with the objective of keeping global warming below 2°C. 
Worldwide, IMF researchers estimate that in 2015 the economic cost – including 
the negative environmental externalities (climate change, air pollution, etc.) – of 
after-tax subsidies totaled $ 5.300 trillion – or an economic cost of $ 10 million per 
minute – or approximately 6.5% of global GDP. This includes a direct budget cost 
of about $ 500 billion for national governments. Comparatively, public subsidies 
for renewable energy have been estimated at approximately $ 100 billion per year. 2 
In 2013, the OECD identified 700 measures, tax allowances, incentives or other 
direct funding supporting fossil fuels among the 40 countries studies. According 
to this analysis, OECD countries provide between $ 50 to 90 billion of fossil fuel 
subsidies, with approximately half of subsidies devoted to agriculture potentially 
harmful for the environment. In France in 2010, these subsidies were essentially 
dedicated to oil consumption, reaching an amount of $ 2.3 billion out of a total of 
$ 2.7 billion (OECD 2013). 
The recent decline in oil prices provides an opportunity that can ease the politics 
of decision-making on this issue. Indeed, the fall in the oil price from 100 to 50 
dollars a barrel  between June 2014 and the end of March 2015, is equivalent to 
a negative carbon tax of approximately € 100 per ton of CO2 (June 2014 euros). 
Moreover, this decrease has been used by a number of developing countries such 
as Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Egypt to phase out public subsidies for fossil 
fuels, which function in economic terms as a negative price on carbon. 
Recent work from the World Bank on the decarbonization of development 3 
demonstrates that it is possible to phase out fossil fuel subsidies while at the same 
time neutralizing the negative effects for the poorest. Furthermore, it has been 
clearly demonstrated that these subsides go principally to the richest households. 
1. OECD (2013) Effective Carbon 
Pricing Report, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.; OECD (2013) Taxing 
Energy Use, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. 
2. UNFCCC SCF, 2014.
3. World Bank (2015)  
Decarbonizing Development.
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An initial compensation mechanism consists of reusing the savings from reduced or 
discontinued subsidies to reduce other taxes. This would therefore redistribute the 
savings and reduce negative affects while changing the relative price of fossil fuels 
in a manner coherent with the low-carbon transition. This was, for example, the 
approach used by Iran in the reform of its subsidies in 2013. A second mechanism 
would consist of redistributing in kind the savings coming from reduced fossil fuels 
subsidies. This was the choice made by Ghana, which compensated the reduction 
of subsidies with the electrification of rural areas, the distribution of more efficient 
light bulbs, and expanding the health coverage to a broader range of its population. 
Progressively redirecting these subsidies can help free up budget capacity to 
support the 2°C transition within a range of sectors, contribute to the financing of 
training for employees, or support the low-carbon investments of companies, etc. 
The redirection of these subsidies does not imply reduced support for households 
and companies; rather, with a comparable budget, it can accompany the transition 
towards a decarbonized economy. 
We recommend that France support the analysis currently led by the OECD, 
the IMF and the World Bank on fossil fuel subsidies that are not aligned with 
decarbonization of the economy. Furthermore, France should support the reduction 
of any inconsistencies within its own national and broader European public support 
policies for fossil fuels. 
3.3  INTEGRATING THE 2°C SCENARIO  
IN MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS AND MODELS
Today, macro-economic forecasting does not generally take climate issues into 
account1. For example, when the IMF analyses future oil prices, the climate challenge 
is completely absent from their analysis. As for the macro-economic models used 
by ministries of finance, they are generally not designed to integrate climate-related 
issues, either in terms of risk to financial stability (particularly due to the absence 
in these models of dedicated modeling of the financial sector in general), or of 
the transformation changes needed in the economy. Many macroeconomic models 
do not depict the interactions between the evolution of natural capital (including 
energy and climate) and other economic variables such as GDP. Moreover, they 
do not disaggregate the energy sector, and are therefore not well-adapted to the 
inclusion of the impacts of the energy transition, whether positive or negative, or of 
the economic transformations compatible with the 2°C limit. Existing models could 
be supplemented with tools allowing ad hoc analysis. However, this remains largely 
unsatisfactory given that feedback loops between GDP, energy and climate, and 
environmental impacts more generally, can be essential to produce accurate results 
and are not modeled by classical methodological approaches. It should be noted 
that the issue of interactions between activity and climate have recently been the 
subject of discussions at the OECD. 2
Despite this, countries are increasingly likely to adopt or have adopted the objective of 
decarbonizing their economies, both in the medium and long term. This commitment is 
included, for example, in each country’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
1. The stakes are not the same, 
depending on whether the models are 
intended to make economic provision, 
evaluate public policies, or – according 
to the time horizon used – projects of 
a few years to much longer term. This 
section is aimed primarily at those 
models used to evaluate public policies 
or produce medium-term 
economic forecasts. 
2. OCDE, Consequences 
of Climate Change Damages 
for Economic Growth, 2014.
_53_MOBILIZING CLIMATE FINANCE - A ROADMAP TO FINANCE A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
(INDCs) (such as those of the United States released in March 2015) 1 but also the joint 
commitment of President Hollande and the Germany Chancellor made public at 
the Petersberg Dialogue in May 2015 and in the final G7 Declaration of June 2015.
Yet the macroeconomic models used by international institutions and ministries of 
finance do not inform political decision-making as to how to guide the decarbonization 
of the economy. It is important to lend credibility to medium-term decarbonization 
commitments and integrate them into existing decision-making processes. To do 
so, it is essential to reconcile price forecasting tools and macroeconomic modeling 
with this new challenge, which will have implications for all economic.
We make the following proposals: 
Before CoP21, finance ministries and international institutions (IMF, OECD, etc.) 
could commit to integrate a 2°C scenario throughout their macroeconomic forecasts. 
Thus any scenario on, for example, the evolution of oil prices should indicate whether 
the assumptions underlying the model are compatible with the 2°C limit.
Also prior to CoP21, a number of states, including France, could commit to 
incorporating factors related to climate objectives within their macroeconomic 
forecasting models. As with all modifications to these models, this integration 
undoubtedly raises methodological issues. These could be productively addressed 
within the framework of the technical discussions at the IMF or the OECD, relying 
in particular on the existing academic work on this subject (see box below). In 
Europe, the European Commission could usefully take the lead on this subject, 
both in order to modify its own models and to facilitate technical exchanges on 
this subject with the Member States.
1. « Substantial global emission 
reductions are needed to keep the 
global temperature rise below 2 
degrees Cel-sius, and the 2025 
target is consistent with a path to 
deep decarbonization. This target is 
consistent with a straight line emission 
reduction pathway from 2020 to deep, 
economy-wide emission reductions of 
80% or more by 2050. The target is 
part of a longer range, collective effort 
to transition to a low-carbon global 
economy as rapidly as possible. »,  
US INDC, March 2015.
A SELECTION OF ONGOING WORK  
TO INTEGRATE CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
DIMENSIONS IN ECONOMIC MODELING
 n The work pursued within the Energy Modelling Forum (https://emf.stanford.edu/).
 n In France, the Energy and Prosperity Chair (co-chaired by Gaël Giraud and Jean-Pierre 
Ponssard) is an international academic platform dedicated to economic modeling of the 
energy transition. It examines in particular the changes in the financial and macroeconomic 
environments that are necessary for the implementation of public policies and micro-
economic and sectoral programs promoting the decarbonization of the economy.
 n The work of the OFCE, ADEME and TNO on the Threeme model used in the study of 
impacts of the draft energy transition and green growth legislation in France (see http://
www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/indic&prev/modele.htm).
Kumhof, Michael, and Dirk Muir, October 2012, Oil and the World Economy: Some 
Possible Futures. Working Paper. 12/256. IMF.
 n Oil and the World Economy: Some Possible Futures
Michael Kumhof, Dirk Muir, October 2012, IMF Working Paper No. 12/256.
 n Matthew Berg, Brian Hartley and Oliver Richters “A stock-flow consistent input–output 
model with applications to energy price shocks, interest rates, and heat emissions” 2015 
New Journal of Physics 17 015011 (http://iopscience.iop.org/1367-2630/17/1/015011).
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3.4  MOBILIZING ADDITIONAL RESOURCES  
THROUGH ‘INNOVATIVE FINANCING’
3.4.1 The financial transaction tax (FTT)
In 2011 in Cannes, the G20 under the French presidency declared itself in favor of 
a financial transaction tax (FTT). However, no thorough discussion has since been 
launched at the international level. The potential revenue generated by a global 
financial transaction tax has varied depending on the approached used: from $ 50 
billion per year according to the Bill Gates report for the G20 in 2011 to $ 300 billion 
per year1. 
If a global agreement cannot be reached on such a tax, then countries willing to 
implement it would need to do so in a manner that would not lead to a relocation 
of financial activity to areas which were tax free. This is at the heart of discussions 
currently underway within the European Union. The European Commission 
proposed a draft directive in 2011, however the European Council failed to reach 
an agreement. Nevertheless, in 2013, eleven EU countries decided to establish an 
Enhanced Cooperation to introduce an FTT. 
In January 2015, the French President spoke in favor of a financial transaction 
tax based on the “broadest possible base.” Following this at the beginning of 
2015, the 11 Member States of the resulting Enhanced Cooperation entrusted 
Austria to preside over the work. Portugal was charged with the coordination of 
the discussions on the implementation of the FTT. This group has committed to 
reaching an agreement before the end of 2015. As part of the preparations for 
CoP21, the pertinent moment to finalize this political agreement sits between June 
and September. This would allow any progress to be valorized in the discussions 
on the financial section of the Paris Climate Agreement. Such an agreement would 
then be translated into a formal draft directive at the EU level by early 2016 at the 
latest. The other Member States not party to the Enhanced Cooperation would be 
unable to block this process.
How to avoid the relocation of financial activity?
Avoiding the relocation of financial transaction and activity is not a new concern. 
It lies at the heart of the technical discussions that are taking place between the 11 
Member States of the Enhanced Cooperation. Detailing the various options under 
discussion is beyond the scope of this report. However it it is useful to specify a 
number of key principles:
– The application of the ‘principle of issuance’ ensures that all financial products 
linked to the jurisdictions of  the 11 countries (corporate shares and bonds in 
particular) will be sufficiently covered by the tax, regardless of the financial actor 
that performs a transaction.
– The application of the ‘residence principle’ particularly for derivatives that cannot 
be traced back to a territorial source (such as interest rate derivatives related to 
LIBOR2) ensures that all stakeholders having their headquarters situated in the area 
of the 11 Member States are covered by the tax
– Finally the application of the ‘beneficiary principle’ would permit the identification 
of the originator of the financial transaction, and thus avoid the undue penalization 
of financial intermediaries within the covered jurisdiction.
1. Spratt, Stephen, and Christina 
Ashford (2011) Climate Finance: A tool 
kit for assessing climate mitigation and 
adaptation funding mechanisms.
 2. Libor (London Interbank Offered 
Rate) is the benchmark rate of a large 
majority of financial products issued 
in different currencies in Europe 
(for the euro we speak of Euribor). 
It is calculated daily. This is the rate 
at which banks lend to each other 
(interbank rate), and the base rate to 
which margins are applied, 
on the day in question, 
to calculate variable loan rates.
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FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX REVENUES  
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENTS
Finding the appropriate way of implementing the FTT, in a context where all 
countries in the world will not be covered, will be a decisive contribution to its further 
development outside of the Enhanced Cooperation jurisdiction. The leadership that 
France intends to exercise on this issue can also be a decisive contribution to the 
future mobilization of financing for climate action globally, particularly in the post-
2020 period.
How much must this tax levy to allow France to fulfill its international climate com-
mitments?
This report does not prejudge an agreement between the 11 Member States 
of the Enhanced Cooperation on the allocation of revenue from the FTT. Given 
the particularly constrained budgetary context, some members of the Enhanced 
Cooperation have already publicly stated their intention to use the revenue of the 
FTT for their general budget. France has repeatedly stated its intention to allocate 
a significant part to climate finance. Without forgetting the financial needs of 
other development issues (e.g. the fight against pandemics such as AIDS) this 
report hypothesizes a 70% allocation by France of the revenues of the discussed 
“European” FTT for the international fight against climate change.
The current annual revenues of the French FTT, implemented in 2012, total € 700 
million. 1 According to the recent work of the World Resources Institute (WRI) 2, new 
and additional public financing will be needed to fulfill the commitments made at 
Copenhagen to transfer $ 100 billion per year by 2020. These new and additional 
financial flows are estimated by WRI at between $ 10 and 15 billion in 2020. 
Although there is no official formula for distribution between countries of such a 
collective commitment, this represents around 10% for France or $ 1-1.5 billion by 
2020. This is based on France’s relative share of Official Development Aid (around 
10%); as well as its contribution to the first round of capitalization of the Green 
Climate Fund (10%). It should be noted in support of this estimate, that Germany 
committed in June 2015 to allocate € 2 billion of additional public finance in 2020 
for international climate finance. 
The following table summarizes the financial estimates: 
1. French Finance Bill of 2015.
2. WRI (2015) Getting to the $ 100 
billion: Climate finance scenarios and 
projections to 2020.
Current
annual
revenues
raised by the
French
FTT
Minimum estimate 
of French share of 
additional funding 
needed in 2020 to 
reach ‘100 billion of 
Copenhagen’
Estimate of 
France’s share of 
the additional
revenues
from the 11-EU 
FTT (presuming  
an allocation of
70 % for climate) 
in 2020
Estimate of  total
required
revenues from the 
11-EU FTT
Total revenues from 
the FTT for France 
in 2020 (presuming
20 % share
of revenues for 
France)
Possible
rhythm of
the increase in
revenues
collected by the 
11-EU FTT
$ 700 million $ 1 billion (or  € 900
million, current
exchange rate)
€ 1.3 billion € 10.5 billion € 2 billion 2017: € 5 bn
2018: € 7 bn
2019: € 9 bn
2020: €10,5 bn
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The projected € 10.5 billion in 2020 is lower than the estimated revenues for 
the 11 Member States of the Enhanced Cooperation evaluated by the European 
Commission at € 35 billion. The objective of $ 10 billion represents a minimum and 
allows for much flexibility (for example, the ability to exclude transactions relating to 
sovereign debt). If between 2015 and 2020 an increase in revenues was envisaged 
through an increase in rates or a broadening of the tax base, for example, then 
these expected modifications should be explicitly included in the initial decision. 
This would ensure necessary clarity for stakeholders.
The success of negotiations on the financial transactions tax by the 11 Member 
States is a key element in the mobilization of additional public climate funding. 
Furthermore, the success of such a mechanism on this smaller scale could give 
impetus to the stalled international negotiations on the subject.
FISCAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT 
T he mobilization of increased financing in developing countries 
must not deprive them of that to 
which they have a right. However, the 
outflow from developing countries 
resulting from tax evasion is in many 
places at least as consequential as 
inflowing development aid. Therefore 
it is not possible to separate the 
development agenda from that of 
global fiscal justice. 
Ongoing discussions on development 
financing include this dimension. 
The progress made in recent years - 
particularly in the context of the Global 
Tax Forum, at the request of the G20 
– demonstrates that major changes 
are possible in the fight against tax 
evasion, offshoring of tax bases and 
revenue profits, etc. Corporate income 
tax makes up a larger proportion of 
the public budget in the developing 
world than in high-income countries. 
Thus, the fight against tax evasion 
by companies is decisive for their 
fiscal sovereignty and their capacity 
to finance domestically the necessary 
investments for development. n
3.4.2 International transport 
Maritime and air transport are large and growing emitters of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The CO2 emissions from the airline industry are estimated at between 2 
and 3% of global emissions, and are expected to grow steadily through 2050, given 
projected increases in domestic and international traffic1. The maritime sector is 
meanwhile responsible for about 3% of global GHG emissions, and could reach 
up to 5% of the total in 2050 2. These sectors face the challenge of improving 
the efficiency and environmental impact per passenger or ton transported, either 
through technological improvements or through operational changes such as “slow 
shipping” or speed reduction in shipping, the impact of which can be significant 3. 
However, it is unlikely that these efforts will fully offset the continued growth in 
emissions due to the expected increases in global trade.
Commitments have been made in both sectors, though with differing levels of 
ambition. In 2010 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted a 
non-binding or “aspirational” goal, aimed at capping emissions from the sector from 
 1. Lee, D.S., L. L. Lim, and B. 
Owen(2013) The Impact of the “2020 
Carbon Neutral Goal” on Aviation CO2 
Radiative Forcing and Temperature 
Response. Dalton Research Institute, 
Manchester Metropolitan University; 
ICAO (2010) Environmental Report 
2010 - Aviation and Climate Change. 
International Civil Aviation Organization.
2. EC. 2013. Time for International 
Action on CO2 Emissions from 
Shipping. European Commission 
Climate Action.
 3. According to Transport& 
Environment, a reduction in speed 
of 10% could reduce emissions 
by as much as 27%. http://www.
transportenvironment.org/what-we-do/
shipping/shipping-and-climate-change
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2020 onwards without assigning specific targets to countries or companies.1 This 
is combined with a second commitment to improve energy efficiency by 2% per 
year until 2020, and the stated ambition to continue this same trajectory to 2050. 
By contrast, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has not, to date, adopted 
any global emissions reduction objectives. At meetings of the IMO in May 2015, the 
Committee for the Protection of the Marine Environment once again postponed any 
commitment to “an appropriate future date” by refusing the proposal of the Marshall 
Islands to cap emissions in the sector 2.
In both sectors, three types of measures are under discussion in relation to climate 
change: fuel taxation; strengthening environmental efficiency norms and standards; 
and GHG offsetting to fund CO2 emission reductions.
For aviation, the two measures that are likely to be prioritized in the short term are 
the introduction of stringent emission norms and standards and the development of 
a carbon offset system. The taxation of fuels used by aviation is a long-term goal, 
but requires the modification of both the Chicago Convention and approximately 
4,000 bilateral air services agreements. At its 38th Assembly in 2013, the ICAO 
recognized the need to offset its emissions and paved the way for an offsetting 
mechanism. It agreed to develop a comprehensive measure to be adopted in 2016 
and implemented by 2020 3.  In parallel, new GHG emission efficiency norms and 
standards (expressed in grams of CO2 per passenger kilometer) for newly certified 
aircraft are under development for implementation in 2020. It would be desirable 
that these standards be expanded to cover all new aircraft (including those that 
have already been certified before this date). 
For maritime transport, mitigation action to date has focused on energy efficiency 
measures adopted by the IMO in 2011. This principally includes the definition of 
emission efficiency standards for large vessels (over 400 tons) built after 2015 through 
an energy efficient design index. This binding measure is a step forward, but given 
the pace of fleet renewal will require between one and two decades before the index 
applies to all ships 4. As in the aviation sector, the taxation of maritime bunker fuels 
is clear long-term objective to pursue. However, this challenge is complicated by the 
capacity of ships to refuel only a few times a year, and thus select ‘accommodating’ 
ports. Finally, without a global emissions cap for the sector, nor inclusion of the 
maritime sector in an emissions trading system, the development of a compensation 
mechanism for the sector remains little discussed. Nevertheless, the EU has initiated 
steps to include the sector in the EU ETS, beginning from 2018, with a measuring and 
reporting obligation for emissions and efficiency of ships using European Union ports.
Carbon offsetting is increasingly seen as one of the most viable means of achieving 
emission reductions in these two sectors. The use of carbon offsetting in transport has 
already created financial flows for GHG reduction projects in developing countries. 
For example, in 2012 the airline industry was included in the EU ETS and allowed to 
offset via domestic and international credits. That same year, European airlines used 
11 Mt of credits to cover 13% of their emissions with 5.3 Mt of credits from projects 
in developing countries (Clean Development Mechanism), creating an estimated flow 
of between € 4 to 22 million 5 to projects in developing countries 6.
Discussions are underway within the ICAO, but it is  too early to know what form 
the offset- or market-mechanism to be proposed by 2016 will take. Preliminary 
estimates by the ICAO suggest that a mechanism could create a demand for credits 
 1. Discussions are currently underway 
within the ICAO in terms of how these 
commitments will be disaggregated 
between countries and regions, taking 
into consideration development levels 
and other factors.
2.  The proposal requested the adoption 
of a quantified and ambitious emissions 
reduction target for the maritime 
transport sector, both in line with the 
principles of the IMO as well as the 
overarching 2°C limit of the UNFCCC.
3.  If the ICAO is unable to propose a 
viable mechanism, the European Union 
has indicated that international aviation 
will be reintegrated in the EU ETS
4. http://www.transportenvironment.
org/what-we-do/shipping/shipping-and-
climate-change
5. Estimation of CDC Climat Research: 
the estimated range is large given the 
strong fluctuations in carbon credit 
prices in 2012.
6. It is difficult today to precisely 
calculate the future demand for offset 
credits stemming from the inclusion 
of the aviation sector in the EU ETS. 
Estimates including international 
aviation suggest that the sector could 
have a future need of approxi-mately 
382 MtCO2 of credits between 
2013-2020 - in addition to their free 
allocation – for conformity (Alberola 
Emilie, and Solier Boris (2012) Including 
International Aviation in the European  
Union Emissions Trading Scheme : A 
First Step To-wards a Global Scheme, 
CDC Climat Research.).Today, EU 
regulation allows companies to use 
only 3.8 MtCO2 of interna-tional 
offsets between 2013 and 2020 given 
limitations on international credit use.
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Source : CDC Climat Research after ICAO Environment Advisory Group Meeting (EAG/7), 29-30 October 2014, scenario n°2
 Figure 20  Estimated 
revenue generated by 
cost of offsets to reduce 
CO2 emissions from 
international aviation  
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from 2021 of between $ 2 - 6 billion in 2025, and up to $ 24 billion in 2035. A 
portion of this demand could be covered by credits from developing countries, 
depending on the types of credits deemed eligible.1 The ICAO has estimated that the 
implementation of a carbon offset mechanism could generate in 2036 an additional 
cost for passengers of approximately $ 10 per seat for a flight from 10,000 to 12,000 
km and $ 1.50 per seat for on a flight between 900 to 1,900 km; this could also lead 
to reduction of global sector profits of 1.2%.
The maritime sector could also be a source of funding for projects in developing 
countries. If the IMO agreed to cap its emissions in 2020, this could create a 
demand for offset credit ranging from several hundred million tons per year in 2030 
to as much as one billion ton a year by 2050 - based on growth and technological 
improvement scenarios (authors’ calculations after IMO 2014) 2.
We thus suggest that France advances the following proposals
For the maritime sector to adopt a carbon-neutral growth target, as has already 
occurred in the aviation sector, ideally using, at the latest, 2020 emission levels. For 
the aviation sector we recommend that the proposals currently under consideration 
regarding norms and standards be ensured to be sufficiently ambitious, and are 
applied to the entire fleet of new aircraft as quickly as possible. 
In parallel, we recommend that carbon offset mechanism - committed in 2010 
by the IACO - be implemented as soon as possible. This is in order to support 
projects with both mitigation and adaptation co-benefits in the Least Developed 
Countries, the Small Island Developing States and Africa. The financial flows to 
support climate-related projects in these countries are currently limited. Prioritizing 
projects from these countries within the ICAO’s carbon offset mechanism could 
ensure a maximum leverage in terms of the additionality of impact. For example, 
mobilizing between $ 2-6 billion could fund the restoration of the 12 million 
hectares of arable land degraded each year. This would allow the aviation sector 
to honor its commitment while making a decisive contribution to both the fight 
against climate change and food security, without threatening the competitiveness 
of the sector. Furthermore, this commitment would revive the international carbon 
 1.Authors calculations after IMO (2014) 
Third IMO Greenhouse Gas Study 2014, 
International Maritime Organization. .
2. ICAO (2013) 
Report of the Assessment of Market-
Based Measures, International 
Civil Aviation Organization.
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Source : CDC Climat Research
crediting mechanisms, building on lessons learned from experience since 2006. 
Thus could be established a price floor of $ 5 to 7 per ton CO2eq. (increasing over 
time), to ensure the minimum level of price visibility required for both offset project 
developers and companies subject to mandatory carbon offsetting.
Given the increasing engagement of companies in the run-up to CoP21, we 
believe that it would be particularly appropriate for the aviation sector disclose and 
commit in 2015 to a set broad principles concerning how it intends to implement 
the commitment made in 2010; even if detailed modalities are agreed to in 2016. 
France could, with other countries, contribute to this process.
3.4.3 Carbon market revenues
To date, carbon pricing mechanisms have not achieved the potential revenue 
streams for international climate finance estimated at the beginning of the decade. 
Given the experience of recent years, only carbon market auction revenue 
appears to offer an opportunity to generate international flows in the short to 
medium term. Nevertheless, most of the revenues from carbon market auctions 
have been to date earmarked for domestic purposes, such as financing emission 
reduction policies as well as reducing social system charges. In the EU ETS, of the 
€ 3.6 billion generated by auctioning in 2013, Member States reported using € 3 
billion for climate–related purposes. Of this a minor part was used for international 
climate finance (0.5 billion €, principally in Germany through the “Sondervermögen 
Energie und Klimafonds” and the UK).
With the expansion of carbon markets worldwide, it is likely that these systems 
will be an increasing source of revenue for governments. In the case of the EU ETS, 
auction revenues are estimated between € 230 to 320 billion between 2015 and 2030, 
given the increased share of allowances auctioned (CDC Climat Research estimates). 
If Member States in the future dedicated an average of 70% of auction revenue to the 
climate, and of that about a third to international climate finance, this could create a 
flows of between € 56 and 79 billion over the period, or €3.5 to 5 billion per year to 
finance projects in developing countries. This would represent approximately 25% of 
all auction revenues, compared to the 15% observed in 2013.
ESTIMATED ALLOCATION OF EU ET AUCTION REVENUES 2015-2030 ♦  
(PRICE OF ALLOWANCE INCREASING BETWEEN 9-34 €)
Total 2015-2030
(in Bn€)
% Used for 
climate *
Of which for 
international 
action **
Total for international climate action  
(in Bn€) 2015-2030
Low-revenue scenario 228 69% 36% 56 (25% du total)
High-revenue scenario 321 69% 36% 79 (25% du total)
♦ The variation between the low and high scenario depends on the date of implementation (2021 compared to 2019) of the “market stability reserve” with an 
impact on the excess of allowances in the market and on the increase in allowance price between 2015-2030.
* In EU 15 countries, an assumption of 75% was used; in Central and Eastern European countries, 50%.
** In the EU15 countries, an assumption of 42% was used; in Central and Eastern European countries, 10%.
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 Figure 21  Summary table of potential revenues  
from selected market mechanisms
The creation of a financial flow for international climate action is dependent on 
the sovereign choices of the Member States. Nevertheless as proposed - but 
refused - in 2008, common principles for the use of auction revenues could be 
developed: France should support a recommendation at the European level that 
25% of the total of EU ETS auction revenues be used to finance climate projects 
in developing countries.
3.5 INCREASING THE LEVERAGE  
OF PUBLIC RESOURCES
3.5.1 The key role of development banks
Development banks can be classified according to their shareholders. Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) are those with more than one country as a shareholders. 
Some have regional, rather than international shareholders.3 Development banks 
with a single Nation State as shareholder are referred to as bilateral/national 
development banks (i.e. the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in France, 
or Banco Nacional De Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) in Brazil). The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) constitutes a particular case and is considered 
here as a MDB.4 
Another distinction is made between: 
– Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), whose mandate is to finance 
development projects in developing countries, and
– National and Regional Development Banks (NDBs), whose main mandate is to 
finance projects in their own country or region. 
The International Development Finance Club (IDFC) regroups 19 institutions 
– among which bilateral, multilateral, regional and national development finance 
institutions are included.
Many Multilateral Development Banks have developed extensive experience 
and expertise on climate finance. According to the Joint Report on MDB Climate 
Finance in 2013, MDBs financed $ 23 billion in climate activities, or approximately 
18% of their total financial operations. Of this, $ 7 billion came from the World Bank 
Group. These figures compare with those of national development banks provided 
financed $ 69 billion in climate projects in 2013.5
Year Range of Funds Raised for International 
Climate Finance
Aviation Carbon Offsetting 
Mechanism 1
2025 
2030 
2035
$ 1.9 – 6.2 billion
$ 3.8 – 12.4 billion
$ 7.2 – 23.9 billion
Carbon Market Auction Revenues 
(EU ETS) 2
2015-2030  
(average)
€ 3.2-5 billion
 1. Preliminary estimates by ICAO 
suggest that a mechanism could create 
a demand for credits from 2021 of 
between $ 2 - 6 billion in 2025 - up to 
$ 24 billion in 2035. Of this, a portion 
of this demand could be covered by 
credits from developing countries 
depending on the types of credits 
deemed eligible. ICAO 2015.
2.  If Member States in the future 
dedicated an average of 70% of auction 
revenue to the climate, and of that 
about a third to international climate 
finance, this could create a flow of 
between € 56 and 79 billion over the 
period, or €3.5 to 5 billion per year to 
finance projects in developing countries.
3. Included in this category are the 
World Bank (IBRD+ IDA), the IFC, the 
AfDB, the AsDB, the IABD, the EBRD, 
the IsDB, the CAF, the CBIE, the AIIB, 
and the regional banks of the CFA Franc 
Zone (BOAD and BOAC).
4.  For operations outside the EU, the 
EIB can be considered as a bilateral 
bank, with the EU as its single 
shareholder. 
5.   CPI, 2013.
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Nevertheless, as highlighted by the NCE report (2015), Multilateral Development 
Banks have an important role to play in increasing the financing of green infrastructure 
in developing countries.
First, MDBs can ease the constraint of convertibility or transfer risk. Massive 
financial flows are expected from institutional investors in high-income countries to 
support low-carbon investment in developing countries. This will require, however, 
that a large portion of the convertibility risk be covered. Currently, only MDBs are 
able to do so thanks to their Preferred Creditor Status (see Box 8). Secondly, as 
recommended by NCE and the Climate Investment Funds,.5 they can scale up the 
use of debt de-risking instruments for co-financers in project structuration. For 
instance, they could take subordinated debt tranches in their non-concessional 
lending, or guarantee project first-losses. Through these policies, MDBs can help 
reduce the overall cost of finance for projects and increase their ‘bankability.’  
 1. Vivid Economics, June2014 ; UNEP 
FI 2011.
SUBORDINATED DEBT
FIRST-LOSS GUARANTEE
A debt is said to be subordinated when the repayment of the interest and/
or principal occurs after the repayment of 
the ‘senior’ debt tranche(s). If the project 
does not generate enough cash flow 
to repay the total debt amount due in a 
given year, subordinated debt amounts 
are capitalized. The capitalized amounts 
do not become due until the final maturity 
date of the subordinated debt, generally 
8 years. This period of time allows the 
project to complete construction and initial 
operational phases and reach a stable 
level of cash flow. 
The inclusion of a subordinated debt 
tranche in the financial package of a 
project significantly reduces the cost 
of senior debt. The global cost of the 
project can thus be lowered. Through 
reducing risk related to the repayment 
of senior debt, a subordinated debt 
tranche could improve the rating 
of the overall project finance, 
categorizing it as ‘investment grade’ 
and thus improving its attractiveness to 
institutional investors. n
F irst-loss guarantees differ from subordinated debt, but have 
a similar objective. Through this 
instrument, a financial institution 
commits to compensate project 
losses during the initial project 
phases, as compared to the 
estimated future cash flows of the 
project. This covers the risk of delays 
in construction and initial operational 
phases that may threaten the 
reimbursement of lenders. n
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Development banks could also increase their use of programmatic approaches, thus 
facilitating access to financing for smaller-scale low-carbon projects in developing 
countries. Programmatic approaches, launched jointly between local government 
and a development banks can have the following advantages by: improving project 
visibility; reducing development costs by sharing and standardizing; improving 
investor confidence concerning the reliability of the regulatory environment of the 
project; and contributing to the creation of a regulatory environment that is aligned 
with a low-carbon development model. See Box below for an example from the 
South African ERI4P program.
Such programmatic approaches could be extended to leverage local banking 
networks for the short-term needs of green projects through credit lines. In developing 
countries, the local banking sector is usually less developed. Nevertheless, these 
networks can provide the working capital needed for small-scale projects (for 
example, individual solar lamps). The Climate Investment Funds already uses this 
programmatic approach for smaller projects; the and the Private Sector Facility of the 
Green Investment Fund has announced its intention to use this approach. We believe 
that the expansion of programmatic approaches would be a step in the right direction. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS 
PROCUREMENT PROGRAM (REI4P)
T he benefits of a programmatic approach to increase access 
to finance is demonstrated by the 
Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers Procurement Program (REI4P) 
in South Africa.
The Government’s commitment to 
offer power purchase agreements for 
3.7 GW of renewables capacity, over 
three rounds, to developers offering 
the lowers price led to $ 5.7 billion of 
investment in 2012, from almost nothing 
previously. The local Standard Bank 
developed significant expertise in the 
area and is committing 15.5 billion Rand 
to the first two rounds making it the 7th 
largest arranger of clean energy asset 
finance in 2012. n
Source : BNEF, 2013
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INCREASING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC FUNDS 
THROUGH FINANCIAL INNOVATION
B eyond the main tools analyzed so far in the present report, multiple 
initiatives and current discussion aim 
to increase the leverage of public 
funds towards maximizing its impact 
on populations and the climate. For 
instance, the Global Innovation Lab1, 
an international initiative aims to 
identify, structure and monitor a new 
generation of financial instruments 
to enhance climate action. The G7 
countries announced in June 2015 the 
interest of basing efforts on their work, 
among that of others, to accelerate 
the access to clean energy in Africa. 
Results-based payment mechanisms, 
such as Climate Impact Bonds, 
allow public authorities to finance or 
‘purchase’ the reduction in negative 
externalities (such as GHG emissions) 
from private sector actors on the basis 
of pre-agreed targets.
These emerging mechanisms are 
promising insofar as they align the 
interest of public and private sector 
actors. They optimize public spending, 
which effectively occurs only if 
private actors reach their objectives. 
Furthermore, strong potential lies 
in better articulating development 
banks and NGOs, which can facilitate 
the financing of small-scale climate 
projects among the poorest, in 
rural areas, in informal settlements 
in large cities, etc. In practice, 
development banks are not adapted 
to the direct financing of very small 
projects. Thus, partnerships between 
these institutions and for instance, 
microfinance lenders, could be further 
developed. Small projects currently 
do not have access to the traditional 
financing instruments offered by  
development banks due to high 
minimum size thresholds. A solution 
for this could be to foster the ‘pooling’ 
of projects under a single holding 
structure that could in turn contract 
financing with a development bank. n
For further information: 
Emmanuel Faber and Jay Naiddo,  
Innover par la mobiisation  
des acteurs : 10 propositions  
pour une nouvelle approche  
de l’aide au développement, 2014
 1. http://climatefinancelab.org
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Beyond development banks, the Green Climate Fund acts as a donor for regional or 
local financial intermediaries. It can bring the necessary additional resources and use 
the risk sharing instruments discussed above to leverage domestic private finance, 
described below. 
In addition to the financial instruments to reduce risks for their co-financers, Public 
development banks can play a key role in terms of labeling green and low-carbon 
projects and disseminating good practices in terms of capital allocation. 
The World Bank is particularly active in this area. It has begun to act as a project 
originator, structuring projects and leveraging private finance without the direct 
inclusion of the individual projects in its own balance sheet. This allows the World 
Bank to expand its role as ‘development project’ developer, without exceeding its own 
financing capacity. 
In conclusion, Climate finance, including projects with climate co-benefits, represents 
15% to 20% of development banks commitments today.1 France’s development bank 
AFD is a frontrunner in expanding beyond this average. It currently has the formal target 
of allocating 50% share financing to projects with climate co-benefits.  
We propose the following recommendations: 
– Each development bank should develop a ‘2°C investment roadmap’ and 
demonstrate its contribution to keeping climate change below the 2°C ceiling as 
well as the carbon content and resilience of its portfolio of funded projects – and its 
procedures to integrate resiliency across its activities.
– Each development bank increases its share of funding towards low-carbon 
investment or to projects with climate co-benefits climates.
– The MDBs and the members of the IDFC work together to offer, possibly in 
connection with the Green Climate Fund, a set of common practices concerning the 
labeling of green projects, enabling the monitoring of the above-mentioned portfolio 
allocation objective. This should also be done to develop a method to certify the 
resiliency of the projects financed.
– Development banks should increase the use of innovative structuring tools for 
climate-related projects, such subordinated debt or first-loss guarantee, that reduce 
the risk perceived by the co-financiers. This will help decrease the overall cost of 
finance the project. This implies that institution shareholders define a dedicated 
strategy and allocate the necessary human resources for implementation.
– Development banks should support, when appropriate, programmatic approaches 
for financing low-carbon development, particularly to support small projects.
– Development banks should integrate into any infrastructure they finance resilience 
and adaptation to climate change as requested by the G7 in June 2015 2. Furthermore, 
development banks also have a role in developing robust methodologies to take into 
consideration adaptation and resiliency that can could be used by private investors.
These recommendations can lead to both increased engagement and calculated 
risk taking by development banks, and therefore raises questions concerning the 
adequacy of their capitalization to do so. This will be explored in the following section. 1. Data communicated by the AFD.
 2.  ‘We pledge to incorporate climate 
mitigation and resilience 
considerations into our development 
assistance and investment decisions,” 
G7,  Declaration of June 2015
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 Figure 22   Capital use ratios of Multilateral Development Banks in 2014
MDB LIMIT PERCENTAGE IN  FISCAL YEAR 2014
Risk Capital Utilization Rate
AfDB <100% 61,2%
ADB (non) 64,4%
IBRD (non) 69,7%
EBRD <90% 73%
IADB <72% 76,9%
IFC <90% 81%
Equity to Loan Ratio
AfDB (non) 48%
ADB >25% 32,1%
IBRD >20% 24,9%
EBRD (non) 49,8%
IADB (non) 33,7%
IFC (non) 89%
Borrowing limit (as a percentage of subscribed capital)
BAfD <100% 39,1%
BAsD <100% 51%
BIRD <100% 58%
BERD <100% 81%
BID <100% 66,2%
SFI <100% 55%
3.5.2 Preventing future capital constraints for development banks
Today, development banks do not appear to be limited by capital constraints. For 
example, the risk capital utilization rate of the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
reached 61% at the end of 2014 (compared to 62% at the end of 2013 with a 
statutory limit of 100%). Its equity to loan ratio attained 52% in the same year 
(compared to 48% with a statutory limit of 100%). This under-utilization for the AfDB 
is due to several factors, including the difficulty of finding projects in creditworthy 
countries and the high geographic concentration of institutions (for example, North 
African countries have further projects to submit, however the Bank has reached its 
prudential cap on exposure for these countries).  Other MDBs equally have existing 
additional headroom as seen in Table 4.
We therefore support the idea of ‘country risk exposure swaps’ forwarded notably 
by France at the end of 2013, and since implemented by the World Bank Group. The 
use of this instrument between MDBs would allow the diversification and mitigation 
of country risks, and an increase in additional capacity for investment in countries 
(e.g. North Africa for AfDB).
Additionally, reforms have been launched or are under discussion in some 
MDBs. These include: the ongoing merger between ADB-ADF (Asian Development 
Source : Joint report on MDB Climate Finance, 2013.
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Bank - Asian Development Fund) that will increase the resulting institution’s 
financial capacity; within the World Bank, the proposed reform of IDA (International 
Development Association) to increase its leverage effect; and discussion to support 
a ‘Green Transition’ at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Excluding the last, these reforms should provide budgetary headroom to increase 
climate finance. 
The share of development banks activities that support the transition is limited. 
If development banks massively increase the volume and relative percentage of 
intervention in this area (given the significant financing needs) and increase risk 
taking, it would probably be necessary for at least the MDBs to increase their 
financial capacity, in accordance with their capital model. For the AFD, which is a 
specific case, the approach would be different (see box below).
In the business model of MDBs, a significant amount of callable, but non paid-in, 
capital co-exists with paid-in capital. This choice first allows for a sufficient level of 
equity while at the same time limiting the cost for shareholder countries; secondly, it 
further guaranties an institution’s solvency. Thus, Standard and Poor’s assigns two 
ratings to these institutions: a ‘stand-alone’ rating (without taking callable capital 
into consideration) and a final ‘issuer credit rating,’ that takes into consideration 
the theoretical possibility of an additional call in case of crisis. Thus, in 2014 the 
AfDB was rated at AA in stand-alone, but remained AAA in issuer credit rating. This 
callable capital serves as a last resort recourse after the exhaustion of all possible 
alternatives in the event of major financial shocks.
In the case of future capital needs, development banks will likely need to increase 
their callable capital. This, however, will not necessarily result in a rise in the public 
deficit or public debt for those Governments involved. Rather, the extension of an 
implicit guarantee (see Box 15), followed by the called capital if needed. Given that 
capital increases are generally complex to negotiate, it is important to prepare well 
in advance. Given that negotiating a capital increase, whether callable or paid-in, is 
complex, it is important that preparations are made well in advance. 
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HOW ARE NATIONAL COMMITMENTS VIS-À-VIS PUBLIC 
BANKS REGISTERED IN PUBLIC ACCOUNTS?
C ontrary to popular arguments, lending by public banks such as the 
Agence Française de Développement or 
the World Bank are not recorded as public 
debt in Europe as per Maastrichtian 
accountancy requirements. EU Member 
States may, however, be either explicitly 
committed - through direct guarantees 
on a loan or an overall guarantee on the 
bank’s operations - or implicitly - through 
the financial operations of private and 
public banks. For European countries, the 
accounting for these commitments follow 
precise rules, defined and monitored by 
Eurostat.
Broadly speaking , there are three types 
of commitments with different impacts on 
public accounts.
1. Capitalization and lending 
The country has a commitment to a bank 
when it decided to subscribe directly to 
the capital of the latter. This commitment 
takes the form of an equity stake in the 
public bank (listed in country’s national 
accounts. This commitment includes, in 
addition to the paid-in share, a non-
paid-in share.
When the non paid-in share is ‘called’ 
by the bank, the country must fund 
this commitment. The required funding 
may come either from an asset sale, 
from a tax increase (all other things 
being equal) or from an increase in the 
public debt. This is also the case when 
a Government assumes the liabilities 
of a private or public bank in default, 
as some Governments did during the 
2008 crisis. This is also the case when 
the Government lends to a public or 
private bank, as demonstrated by the 
French Government’s actions at the end 
of 2008. But, in this case, it can hope to 
recuperate part or all of the lent sum – 
as well as any accumulated interest.
2. Guarantees
A Government may not directly provide 
capital or financing, but rather provide 
a guarantee to cover one or part of a 
given bank’s operations, or even its 
entire balance sheet This guarantee is 
not included in the public debt. However, 
explicit guarantees such as the one 
granted to AFD by the French Government 
are consolidated into the public debt 
under Maastrichtian accounting rules. 
The public deficit is impact-ed only when 
the Government must actually pay on a 
‘called’ guarantee 1. Nevertheless, these 
guarantees are traced in an appendix of 
the country’s national accounts. Rating 
agencies take guarantees granted by a 
Government into account in the rating of 
sovereign bonds, as well as  the probability 
that the guarantee might be called.
3. Off balance sheet commitments 
without explicit guarantees
The public debt is not affected when 
Governments contribute to the capital 
of a public bank, but this capital is not 
called (for example the participation 
of the French State in the capital of 
the World Bank). However, given that 
the non paid-in subscribed capital of 
MDBs is callable at first request, third 
parties consider that in case of default 
the respective Government will pay-in 
this the corresponding amount. This 
is known as an “off balance sheet” 
commitment, not recorded in the public 
debt accounting of the Government; they 
nevertheless are traced in an annex of 
the country’s national accounts (as off 
balance sheet commitments).
This is also the case of loans and other 
liabilities of public banks. If they fail, 
the bank’s creditors would turn to 
shareholders to recover the amount of 
debt owed, beyond the capital alone. n
1. INSEE (2015) Complément 
d’information rapide n°73, 26 March: 
“Loans to foreign States by the French 
Development Agency (AFD) and 
under the guarantee of the French 
State are now included in the assets 
and liabilities of the State in national 
accounts. This treatment has an effect 
of € 3.0 billion on the Maastricht debt 
at the end of 2014, it has no effect on 
net debt.” (Translated by authors)
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3.5.3 Improved coverage of political risks for low-carbon projects
Political instability is one of the leading risks cited by investors to finance climate-
related projects in developing countries (even if these risks do not directly stem from 
climate-related issues). Indeed the political systems of many developing countries 
are considered ‘fragile’ by investors. It is important to further note that ‘climatic 
instability’ will exacerbate geopolitical instability due to increased conflicts around 
the access to resources and resulting internal migrations. This is why the US State 
Department qualifies climate change as a “threat multiplier”.
This kind of vicious circle further strengthens the need to invest now in the transition 
to a low-carbon and resilient economy in developing countries. The concern of 
investors over political risks is reinforced by the long-term nature of the needed 
investments. Finally, these investments often occur in areas where the government 
intervenes not only as a guarantor of the overall political stability, but also as a 
contractual environmental regulator of the project (e.g. feed-in tariffs) and often as 
a direct project participant (e.g. the production and distribution of electricity) or via 
public private partnerships.
MIGA (Multilateral Insurance and Guarantee Agency), the insurance subsidiary of 
the World Bank Group, identify political risks - primarily the risk of adverse changes 
in regulatory environment – which are the second most important factor blocking 
foreign direct investments, after macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, 41% of 
investors surveyed by Vivid Economics declared having abandoned investment 
THE CASE OF AFD
AFD is subject to the “Basel 3” prudential regulation, 
and is not part of institutions exempted 
from the new CRD4 / RRC regulations. 
AFD’s balance sheet grew 7% per year 
on average between 2005 and 2014, 
or doubled over 10 years. It should 
continue to grow and thus progress 
from € 30.6 billion at the end of 2014 
to € 50 billion in 2025. The level of 
annual activity of AFD will stabilize due 
to the implementation of Basel 3 1. As 
an order of magnitude estimate, AFD’s 
activities are expected to total, including 
all loans, € 8.5 billion. According to our 
estimations, if aligned with the prudential 
frameworks used by other development 
banks (such as Basel 2), the AFD could 
increase its activity by  € 1 to 2 billion or 
an increase of close to 25%.2 
Concretely, we propose two options: 
(1) either to submit to the European 
supervisor (ECB) an internal model – as 
done by the largest private banks; 
(2) to define a new set of adapted 
prudential rules determined by the 
Government and applicable to AFD. In 
any case, AFD’s rigorous management 
practices, and its strong governance, 
limit the taking of unreasonable risks. 
We recommend the establishment of 
an inter-ministerial working group to 
develop a concrete proposal before 
CoP21 for implementation in 2016. This 
would allow France to rapidly increase 
the mobilization of public funds by 
2020, with little to no direct impact on 
the public deficit or public debt. n
 1. This is particularly due to increased 
requirements relative share Tier 1 
capital. Not all capital made available 
to AFD by the French Government fall 
into this Tier 1 category. Thus because 
of the distinction that now needs to 
be made between the various equity 
funding categories, the capacity of AFD 
to intervene in country where it is close 
to its exposure ceilings is limited.
2.  Based on estimates 
provided by Carbone4.
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projects in that year for this reason. These risks are particularly pronounced in low-
carbon area.1
The financial instruments currently in place to cover this risk are:
– Coverage of political risk by MIGA.
– The World Bank’s partial risk guarantee (PRG) covers private lenders against 
credit defaults when this result from the default of national government of the host-
country on one of its obligations.
– Overseas private Investment Corporation (OPIC) – a subsidiary of USAID, 
provides political risk coverage similar to MIGA, but specifically dedicated to 
American companies. OPIC prioritizes climate and low-carbon projects.
MIGA currently guarantees an annual volume of $ 3.2 billion, allowing the 
mobilization of $ 6-8 billion of funding for public and private projects. Of this, 20 
-50% is dedicated to climate finance, depending on the definition used. Its modes 
of intervention are:
– Coverage of convertibility risk on loans and capital: in case of currency 
convertibility, MIGA takes the project’s place in interacting with investors in foreign 
currencies; and if necessary procures local currency directly from the host country 
(it has preferred creditor status).
– War and civil unrest: MIGA pays what is due to the financers if the project 
becomes un-exploitable (physical access to the project is cut off, for example).
– Government not honoring commitments; e.g. within the framework of a power-
purchase agreement: MIGA makes the payment in lieu of the Government.
– Expropriation: compensation from MIGA for the full costs incurred when 
expropriation occurs.
– A guarantee to reduce the cost of risk: MIGA guarantees a Government’s 
commitments. An involved bank’s loan is not weighted in the application of the 
Basel 3 prudential regulations, freeing up equity for further operations.
MIGA easily reinsures itself with major private reinsurers given its low default rate. 
Indeed, MIGA benefits from being part of the World Bank group: as host countries 
wish to maintain an overall good relationship with the Group, projects continue to 
operate even in case of serious political unrest. Thus of 700 projects financed by 
MIGA since its inception, only two have called their guarantee. MIGA may also 
intervene in association with the Partial Risk Guarantee program of the World Bank, 
which further reduces the risk for investors.
MIGA is thus a powerful catalyst for leveraging private finance to support both 
private and public projects.  It is likely to significantly reduce the cost of financing 
and thus make the projects “bankable” (see Box 15).
The role that MIGA plays to support projects in the global South constitutes a 
risk-taking by the global North. This guarantee serves to attract capital to projects 
in the developing world and thus can be counted as a public North / South flow. 1. Vivid Economics, 2014.
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We propose that MIGA significantly increase its volume of intervention on projects 
aligned with a 2°C development model. This should occur in conjunction with the 
strengthening of action from the World Bank Group in a coordinated and integrated 
fashion. To leverage private finance quickly, it would be desirable for the World Bank 
Group’s shareholders to forward an ambitious strategy with the objective to rapidly 
multiply the volumes provided for low-carbon development. 
It  could also be of interest to consider the establishment of a specialized credit 
enhancement instrument for transition-related projects or ‘green monoliner.’ It 
would allow the debt of these projects to benefit from the highest possible rating 
from rating agencies. This would, in turn, facilitate the investment of institutional 
investors in these projects. In France, the Ariz guarantee mechanism developed by 
the AFD to support small businesses, could be further expanded. 
3.5.4 Using the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights for climate action?
In April 2009 the G20 authorized the IMF to issue new Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs) amounting to 161 billion SDR1 to help major economies overcome the liquidity 
crisis that threatened their interbank markets. Indeed, one of the principal objectives 
of IMF is to ensure financial stability. As such, it is worth investigating the use of 
SDRs, particularly in a context where climate change is increasingly recognized as a 
major threat to this stability. Specifically what are the benefits, the consequences and 
difficulties? Could there be a donation or lending of SDRs?
A few reminders
SDRs are an option (a ‘right’) available in four currencies: the euro, the US dollar, the 
yen and the sterling. Governments that are members of the IMF are allocated SDRs 
free of charge. The SDR is an asset or in reality a currency option, registered in the 
amount of the country’s foreign exchange reserves. This allocation is accompanied 
with an equal debt vis-à-vis the IMF, which is registered in the balance sheet of the 
central bank of the country concerned.2  
The debt is accounted - following ‘Maastricht’ rules for European countries - as 
a debt to the rest of the world. If one gives or lends a SDR, it comes out of the 
book value but remains a liability. It is the Government that holds the SDRs. The 
decision to loan or give SDRs is therefore up to the Government as the central bank 
having only a role of account holder. However, it is the central bank that bears the 
associated currency risk; if the relative value of the SDR is weakened, the Central 
Bank will have to acknowledge the loss.
It is important to note the fact that the IMF disposes the power to create SDRs 
ex nihilo. Thus, the SDRs allocated in 2009 to all IMF member countries are not an 
immediate counterparty to labor, products or market services, unlike the classic 
exchange reserves, which are obtained in exchange for a sale in the real economy.
Once a Government elects to exercise its option, it can transfer all or part of its SDRs 
to a third party (another Member State of the IMF or an eligible financial institution)3 
in exchange for currency. Its foreign exchange reserves are thus modified, as the 
currency replaces the SDRs4. This mechanism enables a Government to acquire 
 1. On 30 April 2014, an SDR was 
valued at $ 1.55. Over the successive 
allocations from the IMF, 204 billion 
SDRs have been created, the equivalent 
of € 316 billion euros. France, for 
example held at 3à April 2014 
9,287,000 SDRs equivalent 
to $ 14.4 billion. 
2. This debt vis-à-vis the IMF has an 
undetermined tenor and in practice will 
never be reimbursed.
3. Most multilateral development banks 
are authorized to hold SDRs.
4. The Government must pay to the IMF 
interest calculated on the difference 
between the SDR allocation of the 
country and the amount actually held. 
The rate is a weighted average of the 
short interest rates of central banks 
and associated with the four currencies 
(currently 0.9%).
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foreign reserves in a given currency, whereas borrowing the equivalent sum from 
international currency markets would cost more than the rate demanded by the IMF.
 Granting SDRs? 
SDRs cannot be granted to entities that have not been approved to hold SDRs by 
the IMF. For example, the Green Climate Fund is not currently an approved holder1. 
It might be possible to launch the necessary procedures for its accreditation. It is 
also foreseeable to donate SDRs to an authorized multilateral development bank. 
An MDB could then convert the SDRs to freely convertible currencies to lend or to 
increase additional leverage on capital markets, given that its resources would have 
been increased. This donation could be accompanied by a political, rather than 
legal, commitment to pursue more low-carbon, climate-resilient projects. 
Granting SDRs, however, poses several problems. It causes a de facto decrease 
in foreign exchange reserves of the donor country. Replenishing foreign exchange 
reserves could be financed through the creation of local currency by the central 
bank of a value equivalent to the SDRs donated. This option would probably be 
highly debated and most likely prohibited in the case of national central banks part 
of the Eurosystem where it is considered as assimilated to monetary financing. If the 
reduction of foreign exchange reserves were fully offset by the Government, there 
would be little advantage to using SDRs in this fashion.
Lending SDRs?
Given that granting SDRs appears to be challenging, the long-term lending without 
interest could be considered. This is based on the precedent in 2009 where a loan 
of 1.328 billion SDRs was used to finance the IMFs Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF). For instance, France could use a small portion of its SDR as a long-
term no-interest loan to the Green Climat Fund or another dedicated fund structure. 
If not eligible today to receive a grant, the GCF is eligible for receiving loans of 
SDRs..During the lending period, the Banque de France would formally commit to 
provide SDRs or currencies (euros or dollars) to the fund with an agreement under 
which the Banque de France would immediately and bilaterally convert SDRs into 
currency. This loan would nevertheless incur a debt owed to the Banque de France 
by the GCF. This debt would be included in the Banque de France’s the accounts 
receivable portion of its balance sheet to account for the temporary reduction of 
its reserves (in SDRs or currencies). It will likely be necessary to check whether the 
formal agreement of the IMF board is required for such an operation.
In conclusion, the use of SDRs allocated in 2009 has the major advantage of 
incurring no impact on the deficit or public debt of the country concerned. On the 
other hand, it is useful to remember that SDRs were allocated to countries at a lesser 
cost than what normal currency reserves would cost (obtained in exchange for 
export of property or service). This technical analysis justifies the value of pursuing 
discussions on the possible use of SDRs to mobilize additional climate finance. Given 
the importance of climate change, no tool should not be ruled out for reasons of 
principle only – particularly when a first technical analysis demonstrates potential.
We propose that France entrusts further analysis of this subject to a qualified 
pluralistic panel of financial experts, whose objective would be to present concrete 
proposals prior to CoP21.
1.  The accreditation would require an 
agreement by 85% of the IMF Executive 
Board. The ensemble of the Green 
Climate Fund’s board members would 
have to approve accreditation.
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Source : Vivid Economics, 2014
 Figure 23  Two thirds of the financial support from development  
finance institutions is allocated to public sector organizations
11%
14%
65%
n PUBLIC SECTOR BODIES
n PRIVATE FIRMS
n  LOCAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
n  PRIVATE EQUITY, VENTURE CAPITAL AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS
n OTHER DFIS
3.5.5 Supporting the development of low-carbon, climate-resilient projects
The lack of projects is often presented as the main obstacle to the transition to a 
low-carbon development model. In fact, this widely shared diagnosis1 is linked to the 
broader lack of project-development capacity in developing countries, particularly 
in LDCs. Low-carbon specifications are still poorly integrated into the terms of 
reference of projects in the development phase (also true in the global North), and are 
often seen, sometimes in error, as an un-funded short-term additional cost, even if 
it generates medium- and long-term savings. Project developers do not necessarily 
have the skills needed to develop low-carbon projects in the global South. This is 
also valid for Governments with an impact on the quality of the dialogue necessary 
to build a contractual framework conducive to establishing bankable low-carbon 
projects. This lack of bankable projects is particularly evident in Africa. The public 
finance from high-income economies can play an important role, at a relatively low 
cost, to catalyze the development of a “pipeline” of green projects in the South.
Development banks are important sources of technical assistance and capacity 
support, directly or through funds allocated for project preparations. These funds 
can help project developers, but also the Government in recipient countries, to 
prepare low-carbon projects that align with national strategies (e.g. GIZ / KfW 
program, Public Private Partnerships Advisory Fund PPPIAF of the Bank World, the 
UNEP Africa Carbon Asset Development program).
As shown in Figure 23, development banks are involved in only a limited fashion 
through investment funds that channeling equity and risk capital to support the 
capital investments in projects under development.
 1. NCE,2015.
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Development banks could increase support to actors that play a key role in the 
emergence of private projects. Export credit agencies could also play a role by 
supporting private equity funds for the development and the initial investment in 
private low-carbon projects in developing countries. These two types of institutions 
have relatively less-expensive expertise to offer compared to the private sector, 
which could reduce the initial costs for developing countries. They also dispose of 
operational and regulatory leverage to accelerate negotiations with local partners to 
set up projects. The Green Climate Fund could also develop technical assistance 
programs to assist with the implementation and development of projects, and / or 
capital investment in development funds, in conjunction with the local partners that 
it sponsors.
Finally, the low-carbon transition requires the exploration of new industrial 
processes and techniques to scale-up low-carbon energy production, some 
of which are not yet at a commercial-grade stage (carbon capture and storage, 
hydrogen mobility, etc.). Subsidies and public guarantees from developed countries 
are necessary, in connection with, the wide-spread adoption of a carbon price, 
to accelerate the availability of these technologies in both Northern and Southern 
countries and to accelerate the scale-change necessary for their deployment.
 1. In low-income countries when no 
other viable alternatives are available. 
EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES  
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
E xport Credit Agencies (ECA)  through loans, guarantees and insurance for investment 
projects – finance amounts equivalent or greater 
than official development assistance. Their mandate 
is to support their country’s foreign trade. While 
current ECA support to climate finance flows are 
limited, they nevertheless have a role to play given 
that the provision of (often critical) guarantees for the 
development of energy sector projects is often at the 
core of their respective missions. 
Following the initiative taken by the United States, a 
trend has emerged to strengthen the climate dimension 
of ECA financing. The US agency Exim excluded, except 
exceptional cases,1 coal projects. The United Kingdom 
and France have also voiced support for the end to 
public support from ECAs for coal-fired power plants, as 
part of a multilateral agreement under the aegis of the 
OECD. However, this trend has not yet extended to other 
G7 countries. Intense discussions are nevertheless 
underway under the aegis of the OECD to define a new 
common standard.
The export credit agencies countries party to the 
OECD’s ‘Credit Exports Arrangement’ were mandated 
at the Ministerial meetings of the OECD in 2014 and 
2015 to study how to contribute to the fight against 
climate change. To meet this request, and building on 
a detailed technical study, the OECD working group on 
this subject reached the following political consensus:
– Firstly, it was decided by the participating Member 
States that greenhouse gas emissions from all fossil 
fuel power plants receiving public export support 
would be reported to the OECD;
– Secondly, the participating Member States have 
amended the Arrangement’s sectoral annex on climate 
change to propose more favorable instruments and 
policies to support projects contributing to the fight 
against climate change in order to encourage exports 
in this area. Discussions are underway to include 
increased support for the exports of ‘smart’ power 
grids that allow CO2 emission reductions by 20%.
In an environment where political agreement is 
still limited on the integration of climate change by 
credit export agencies, we recommend that leading 
agencies on this topic work together to build the best 
standards, in addition to the commitments made in 
the multilateral context of the OECD. n
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3.6 MOBILIZING PRIVATE FLOWS TOWARDS THE 
TRANSITION OF A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
3.6.1 The initiatives of private financial sector actors to finance the 
transition to a 2°C economy
From the United Nations Climate Summit in September 2014 to the Climate Finance 
Day in May 2015 hosted by the Caisse des Dépôts (CDC), European Investment 
Bank and Paris Europlace, private financial sector actors have increased the nature 
and scale of their commitments related to climate change. Two of the principal 
types of commitments are outlined below.
Improved understanding of climate risk exposure of investors 
The first type of commitment has focused on improving the understanding of 
financial sector actors exposure to climate risk. Climate risk refers to both policy-
related carbon risk (e.g. how will the business model of the company invested in be 
affected by the implementation of a carbon price or a norm limiting GHG emission?); 
and risk stemming from the physical impacts of climate change (e.g. the impacts 
on supply chains or on infrastructure by sea-level rise, changes in the hydraulic 
cycle, etc.). Currently, this second physical risk has been the most present in the 
initiatives by financial sector actors. Indeed, a company whose production relies 
heavily on water resources may see the number of days where, due to increased 
droughts, it is unable to produce at full capacity. This risk therefore has a financial 
impact on company, and consequently an impact on shareholders and investors. 
Rating agencies, particularly Standards and Poor’s, are working towards improving 
the integration of this risk in their analysis. S&P will publicly disclose the results of 
its work on this topic before CoP21. 
Insurance companies also have a direct interest in the improved inclusion of climate 
risks into their business models and insurance policies. As such, some companies 
have signed on to an initiative led by Willis Group to review risk management 
systems to provide improved information to market actors on the incremental cost 
stemming from the increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.
Disclosing the carbon footprint of investment portfolios
The second type of commitment focuses on disclosing the carbon footprint 
of investment portfolios. This can include both the direct and indirect emissions 
funded by investors, whether in stocks, company bonds, or infrastructure projects 
(the latter particularly in the case of infrastructure funds). This is the explicit objective 
of the Montreal Pledge, which has been signed by 49 investors representing $ 1.5 
trillion of assets under management and aims to reach $ 3 trillion of assets under 
management before December 2015.1 Carbon footprint measurement can also 
include commitments to reduce this footprint, also called ‘decarbonisation.’ This is 
for instance the case of the Portfolio Decarbonisation Coalition, with 12 investors 
representing $ 45 billion of assets under management and which aims to gather $ 
100 billion of assets under this ‘decarbonisation commitment’ before CoP21.2 
 1. Data from May 2015, Montreal 
Pledge website. 
2. Coalition run jointly by the Montreal 
Pledge, Amundi, CDP and AP4.
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Reducing the carbon footprint of investment portfolios through a number of often 
complementary actions:
First, divesting from fossil fuels. The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund (GPFG) 
is one of the largest institutional investors in the world, with a volume of $ 890 
billion in 2014, or approximately 1% of global market capitalisation. GPFG recently 
announced on June 5th, 2015, its intention to divest over $ 10 billion of its investments 
in coal. Furthermore, in May 2015, Axa committed to divest from companies that 
either generate more than 50% of their turnover coming from coal or use an energy 
mix composed of 50% of coal. Second, shareholder activism: shareholders request 
that companies in which they invest to reduce their GHG emissions. This type of 
commitment was made by Caisse des Dépôts in May 2015. This has also been the 
approach used recently by shareholders of companies such as Shell and BP who 
requested at the most recent General Assemblies that these companies test their 
business models under an economic scenario coherent with the 2°C limit. Thirdly, 
dynamic portfolio management: overweighing companies that are the most active 
in decarbonising the economy. This is for example the choice made by Mirova, the 
asset management branch of Natixis Group. 
All of these approaches are complemented by commitments to invest more in 
“green” projects and companies. Indeed, in New York in September 2014, the 
insurance sector committed to doubling its green investments to reach $ 82 billion 
in 2015. Increasing green funding is also one of the commitments tracked by the 
Investors’ Platform for Climate Action1 launched by the Institutional Investors Group 
on Climate Change (IIGCC) in May 2015 in Paris. To date, this platform has gathered 
more than 400 investors from more than 130 countries and represents more than 
$ 25 trillion of assets under management. 
Through these non-exhaustive examples, it is clear that the dynamic surrounding 
the commitments made by the private financial sector is expanding in an 
unprecedented manner. This can be explained in particular by the fact that climate 
risk is progressively leaving the zone of “extra financial” risk, and is being directly 
included in purely financial risk assessment. This is precisely the idea formed by 
the former Secretary of State of Treasury, Henry Paulson, when he stated “Climate 
change poses not just a massive risk to the environment, it’s the single biggest risk 
to the global economy today”2. In the same way that markets created a financial 
bubble that burst in 2008, they are today creating a ‘carbon bubble.’ The carbon 
bubble is the gap between the maximum share of known reserves that the energy 
sector can exploit to keep global warming below 2°C, and what today is included 
in their respective corporate accounts and used in market price valuation3. In 2014, 
Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, was the first to stress this 
analysis: “The vast majority of reserves are unburnable” if the world is to avoid 
catastrophic climate change.4 
We thus make the following proposals:
Having made the ‘Agenda of Solutions’ an essential part of CoP21, France has 
the legitimacy to encourage private financial actors that have not yet taken explicit, 
and precise, commitments, to do so before CoP21. This equally implies gathering 
1. http://investorsonclimatechange.org
2. See the Risky Business Project. 
3. See the work of Carbon Tracker 
Initiative for further information.
4. Speech during the World Bank 
seminar of October 2014 on carbon 
price: http://www.emergingmarkets.
org/Article/3389530/Economics-and-
Policy/Carney-hammers-the-point-you-
cant-burn-all-the-oil.html
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the ensemble of commitments on the Nazca Platform1 initiated by the UNFCCC: 
this platform aims to improve the clarity and visibility of these commitments, as well 
as establish a monitoring system to follow implementation (see Section 4). Indeed, 
the non-fulfilment of these commitments would be damaging to the credibility of the 
signal currently given by financial sector actors. 
These initiatives by private actors demonstrate the way forward. However, in 
order to reach the scale of action needed to ensure the emergence of an economy 
coherent with the 2°C limit, voluntary actions should be strengthened by legislation 
that France could support in a European and international context – as well as 
domestic action. This is explored in the following section.
3.6.2 Initiatives to integrate the climate challenge  
in financial regulation
The Investor Platform, launched in Paris in May, manages $25 trillion in assets, 
distinguishing four types of commitments: measuring, engaging (shareholder 
engagement), reallocating (including the decarbonization of portfolios) and reinforcing 
action on the fight against climate change (dedicated investments, e.g. green bonds). 
Policymakers have an opportunity to speed up these ongoing dynamics.
At the international level, an important first milestone was reached in April 2015 
by the initiative of France and the Governor of the Bank of England, also chairman 
of the Financial Stability Board. The G20 finance ministers have requested that the 
FSB “review how the financial sector can take account of climate-related issues”. A 
first report is expected in September or October 2015, in the context of the Annual 
Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank.
At the national level, many initiatives have been identified by the UNEP Inquiry 
into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System. This initiative was established 
in January 2014 in order to inventory the links between financial regulation and 
sustainability, and to propose possible improvements. These are presented in its 
latest progress report “The coming financial climate,” published in May in Paris. 
Examples include actions taken by the People’s Bank of China as part of a work 
program related to the construction of the next five year plan (2016 - 2020) aiming 
at “establishing China’s green financial system.”2 The Central Bank of Bangladesh 
has already implemented different bank refinancing rates according to the “green” 
quality of projects that are financed by the banks. Another example is that of the 
Bank of England which, as a supervisor, requires insurers to review their assessment 
of climate risk, and is discussing, as a central bank, to have its Financial Policy 
Committee take climate change issues into consideration as an element of risk to 
financial stability.
It is interesting to note that the integration of sustainability issues, and especially 
climate, into the financial regulation is not an agenda initiated solely by developed 
countries. This is rather a growing concern around the world, at parity between 
emerging, developing and developed countries.
The integration of climate issues into financial regulation by Nation States, 
supervisors and regulators can take several forms, which are summarized in the 
chart below:
1. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
companyindustries.aspx?finance=true
2. UNEP Inquiry (2015b) Establishing 
China’s green financial system. 
UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a 
Sustainable Financial System.
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Source : UNEP Inquiry 2015
 Figure 24  The different means of integrating climate change into financial regulation 
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Without going into the details of each proposal, we recommend that France act 
on the following points:
Following the adoption of Article 48 of the Energy Transition Law for green growth 
in May 2015, France is the first country in the world to legally require that managers 
and asset holders better take into account climate risks, measure the carbon 
footprint of their financial portfolios, and disclose both the proportion of low-carbon 
investments and the manner they make their investment strategies consistent with 
the internationally agreed 2°C limit.
We suggest that France could communicate broadly on these recent legislative 
developments with other countries. The French government could rapidly propose, 
at least to its European partners, to move forward in this direction by officially 
requesting the European Commission to explore this issue at the EU level. Some 
of these measures have also been debated in Sweden, as well as in in China. We 
thus propose that France propose to its G20 partners to cooperate on this issue to 
foster the development of a harmonized regulatory approach that would facilitate 
the emergence of international standards and strengthen impact.
We also propose to explore a method to help integrate climate-related issues into 
the definition of fiduciary duty. This principal is used by finance sector professionals 
(directors, managers, agents, advisors, regulators...), as “trusted third parties,” to 
act in the best interest of their clients. This obligation is called “fiduciary” because 
it is essentially an obligation of loyalty, honesty and good faith (fides in Latin). To 
the extent that climate change – and the associate risks – has been demonstrated 
to exist, it is legitimate to include in the guiding principles - and in the practices of 
actors - that any inaction to take these issues into consideration places economic 
actors at risk. This includes households that rely on third parties to act in their 
best interest, particularly in the context of privately funded pension systems. These 
issues have already been integrated into the guiding texts in South Africa (2011) and 
the Netherlands.
To facilitate the optimal functioning of financial markets, information must be 
available to all participants and regulators. Thus, for regulators to assess the impact 
of climate change  and related climate policies (e.g. carbon price) - on the loan 
portfolio of a commercial bank, they must have accurate information on the carbon 
footprint and impact of loans on their books. This information is missing today. 
In order to build an adequate regulatory system, it is necessary today to put into 
place the necessary information system. Therefore, in addition to measuring the 
carbon footprint or impact of institutional investors’ investments, we recommend 
that commercial banks also communicate on the carbon content of their lending 
activities (project financing, corporate loans, mortgages, etc.).  
3.6.3 Scaling-up the green bonds market
The Background Report on Long Term Climate Finance, commissioned by the 
German Presidency of the G7 and released in June 2015 presents the recent 
development of the green bonds market. This market in 2014 totaled $ 53.6 billion 
across different sectors as seen in the following figure.
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Source : CICERO/CPI (2015) Background Report on Long-Term Climate Finance, using data of BNEF (2014), CBI (2014a),  
CBI (2015), World Bank (2015).
 Figure 25  The repartition of green bonds by emitter
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Firstly, it is key to note that green bonds in and of themselves do not create 
additional capital flows.1 However, the massive growth in volume provides a signal 
to the market on the materiality of the low-carbon transition thereby increasing 
attractiveness. There is nevertheless a risk if investors doubt the underlying nature 
of the assets involved. The green bonds market requires standards that guarantee 
its integrity and sanctions for non-compliance in order to gain the trust of investors. 
Standardization could also reduce the cost of issuances. This is supported by the 
proposals of the UNEP Inquiry in “The future financial climate” of May 2015 in which 
they call for:
– Establishing standards ensuring the integrity of the market, with sanctions for non-
compliance;
– Launching a program of strategic emissions from cities, public agencies and 
development banks;
– Reducing the issuance costs by simplifying the process;
– Encouraging the securitization of green bonds, for example as part of planned 
reforms in the European Capital Markets Union;
– Developing purchasing policies by public institutions; and
– Supporting market liquidity.
All of these measures will ultimately improve the comprehension of climate risks 
by private financial actors and should lead to increased funding for the transition to 
a low-carbon economy; and inversely less funding for activities incompatible with 
the 2°C limit. These measures, to be taken primarily at the national level, assist in a 
better allocation of domestic savings to low-carbon activities rather than developing 
international flows. This is consistent with the fact that domestic savings will be the 
principal source of finance mobilized for investment. Nevertheless, the green bonds 
issued, for example, by development banks can help scale-up private capital flows 
from high-income economies to finance green projects in the global South.
1.  In the case of bank refinancing, they 
nevertheless would free up capital that 
can be reinvested.
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3.6.4 Adapting international accounting standards
International accounting standards have a significant impact on the decisions of 
large companies. It is recognized that the current European standards (IFRS / IAS) 
are not adapted to take into account the business model of long-term investors, 
or to increasing long-term liabilities.1 The 2007-2009 crisis highlighted some 
shortcomings of the “fair-value” principle. This principle is often applied in practice 
to value financial assets of a company, according to the net present value of cash 
flows that they will generate in the future. The choice of the discount rate, which 
should reflect the perceived risk associated with these flows, is a very sensitive 
parameter in this calculation, and cannot be easily determined for new sectors, and 
even less so in developing countries. The standards also impose variation in the 
rate and as such, a variation in the value of the asset as soon as an event affecting 
this risk occurs. This subsequently causes a certain volatility in company accounts 
and a need to immediately increase contingency provisions, including on assets 
with long-term investment horizons.
Discussions are already underway at the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) on the evolution of the fair value principle. It could be envisaged 
to link these discussions to the detention of long-term assets such as low-
carbon investment projects, to ensure that changes in the regulation do not 
deter their holding.
We propose that France jointly requests with other countries that the revision by 
the IASB of international accounting standards take into account climate-related 
issues. This could include, for example, the inclusion of principles to assess the 
value of assets in a 2°C scenario.
1. See in France the 11.48 
recommendation of the White Paper on 
financing the ecological transition
2. CERES (2014) Investing 
in the Clean Trillion.
3.  UNEP FI (2011) Universal Ownership: 
Why environmental externalities matter 
to institutional investors, United Nations 
Environment Project Financial Initiative.
4. http://www.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/
research-programmes/stranded-assets/
INSURING AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
Physical climate risks are increasingly considered by insurers, namely in the damage branch, given the rising costs of increasingly frequent natural 
disasters. Links with climate change have already been observed (for example, it 
is estimated that the real estate value currently threatened by storms in the US 
amounts to $ 1.5 trillion in mid-2014)2. The low level of the integration of climate 
risks by the sector is due to the lack of historical data. Indeed, while climate change 
is inevitable, its pace and scale are difficult to establish, since they depend on GHG 
emissions scenarios. Finally, the risks are cross-cutting and diffuse, particularly 
in densely populated areas. Nevertheless, climate sciences and modeling are 
improving and is growing increasingly able to inform stakeholders of climate 
impacts associated with a particular scenario. 
If the amount of damage expressed in dollars is correlated to the economic value 
of assets currently insured, the most serious damage is observed in developing 
countries. These countries are most vulnerable to climate change. Furthermore, the 
population in these countries tend not to have the resources to obtain or access 
insurance to protect against physical risks (drought, crop losses, flooding) nor to 
‘build back better’. Thus, the importance of the latest commitment made by G7 
countries to facilitate the access for 400 million people in the most vulnerable 
developing countries to either direct or indirect insurance against accidents 
generated by climate change. n
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MAKING REGULATORY MEASURES  
CONDUCIVE TO HOLDING LONG-TERM  
ASSETS (BASEL 3 AND SOLVENCY 2)
W ith the exception of the Bank of England, the regulators of the 
banking and insurance sectors have not 
yet identified the risk of climate change 
as one likely to affect financial stability, 
while stability is the objective of financial 
regulation. This situation could be changing: 
insurance supervisors have recently become 
more aware of the importance of the 
activities of insurers in protecting against 
natural disasters. The next step will be 
moving from awareness of the risks posed 
by climate change, to a proper inclusion 
of this risk category into the regulatory 
framework for insurance.
There is almost a zero probability that the 
impacts of climate change will be null on 
economic models, assets, infrastructure, 
capital, the global potential economic 
growth, etc. For example, a study of 2,400 
companies conducted by UNEP FI showed 
that 50% of their profits are threatened by 
climate change.3
Yet, to date, financial models used within 
the framework of  prudential banking and 
insurance regulations (Basel 3, CRD4 / CRR, 
Solvency 2), do not contain any  incentive to 
consider environmental risks. It is important 
to better understand how this risk will weigh 
on assets in terms of credit risk, of over-
valuation, etc. Moreover, some aspects of the 
current regulation do not encourage the low 
carbon transition, which involves risk taking 
with long pay back periods. Under current 
regulations, holding of long-term and illiquid 
assets by banks is currently ‘costly’ in terms of 
regulatory capital requirements. Banks are not 
encouraged to hold them, particularly if their 
returns are modest, and even though their less 
volatile charachteristics are a plus within the 
frame of the current regulations.
Economic theory generally prioritize that 
policy makers focus on putting into place, 
at the macro-economic level, a sufficient 
carbon signal. However, prudential regulations, 
whose fundamental objective is to ensure 
financial stability, must contribute to the 
emergence of an enabling environment for 
these investments. Unfortunately, in the real 
world, the level of carbon price and other 
externalities are neither high enough, nor 
sufficiently visible. As a result, financial 
markets do not benefit from the right signals 
nor the right information. This justifies specific 
actions. It may appear easier to establish 
a carbon price signal than to reform the 
prudential and accounting environment of 
the banking and insurance sectors. However, 
this does not appear to be the case: setting a 
high carbon price has encountered ten years 
of strong resistance from certain industrial 
sectors because it directly penalizes their 
high-carbon activities. The banking and 
insurance sectors themselves do not have this 
type of direct conflict of interest. In addition, 
ongoing work, and in particular those of the 
Smith School (Oxford),4 indicated that the 
interest of the investors is to divest from fossil 
fuel industries to invest more in alternative 
energy. The evolution of the prudential and 
accounting framework would support and 
accelerate this emerging trend.
Initiatives to develop climate stress tests and 
assess the carbon impact of stocks, bonds 
or other assets  should be supported in the 
appropriate international fora to facilitate 
integration into the prudential monitoring of 
institutions. We propose that France – as it 
has already done with the Financial Stability 
Board in April 2015 – officially request 
that the Bank for International Settlements 
(Basel Committee) facilitate discussions in 
a collective manner. In parallel, the Agence 
Française de Développement being subject 
to Basel 3, we propose that the AFD launch 
a technical analysis of the impact that 
this type of test would have internally (see 
Section 3.5.2). n
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3.6.5 What role for the monetary policy in response to climate change?
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the central banks of the United States, the 
Eurozone and Japan launched quantitative easing policies to tackle the 2008 
crisis. These policies are still in place and currently focus on counteracting 
the risks associated with deflation. The Chinese central bank has also seen its 
balance sheet increase significantly.  
In this context, it appears that central banks have already introduced ‘repo’ policies 
(accepting assets as collateral in exchange for a loan), which encompass a broad 
range of eligible asset classes. The majority of these policies consider that the 
acceptability of collateral depends solely on its financial rating (mainly integrating 
the purely financial risk of the underlying asset). Some central banks, such as in 
China or Bangladesh, are already moving or planning to guide the choice of collateral 
according to ‘green’ criteria. The debate is therefore open at the global level.
Moreover, in practice, the European Central Bank has chosen to purchase assets 
to refinance small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), based on strict criteria. In 
this case, the objective is not to question the relevance of such a decision but to 
note that, whether in developed or developing countries, the interaction between 
monetary policy and private capital allocation choices exists.
Therefore, the question of the specific role of central banks in the fight against 
climate change arises. This is particularly relevant given the probability that climate 
change will have at least a small – and more likely a substantial - impact on financial 
stability and the growth potential of economies.
The objective is not to directly favor particular sectors, but rather to improve 
the integration of the cross-cutting impacts of climate change and the financing 
of a low-carbon economy. This, in turn, will help avoid and mitigate the risks to 
future economic growth and prosperity. In a world where the price of carbon could 
perfectly internalize the value of climate change impacts, there would be little role 
for monetary policy. However, it is clear that this is unlikely to be the case in the 
immediate future. 
Given that financial markets are not perfectly efficient1 and that currencies are 
not neutral in terms2, the dominant ideology that dictates that the actions of the 
central bank should not take into account climate risks and the explicit financing of 
an economy compatible with the 2°C limit may be the subject of discussions, both 
within each currency zone and at the international level. 
We make the following proposals:
– Central banks could include in their annual reports the variation in the relative 
share of assets that can be labeled as “climate-coherent” in their balance sheet;
– Central banks could establish an official collaboration to identify how these 
issues have – or could be – integrated into internal processes as well as instruments.
1. The recent Nobel Prize winner J. 
Shiller has theoretically demonstrated 
this contention.
 2.See, for example :  Illusion financière 
: des subprimes à la transition 
écologique (Gaël Giraud, éditions de 
l’atelier, 2014) or the more technical 
article from Nicolas Bouleau http://
www.nicolasbouleau.eu/critique-de-
lefficience-des-marches-financiers/.
3. This reserve aims to resorb the 
increasing surplus of quotas that were 
not used since 2009 and will limit the 
number of quotas available on the 
market between 400 and 833 million.
4. Data from Thomson-Reuters.
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MOBILISING THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union (EU) has committed to reduce its GHG emission by at least 40% by 
2030 compared to 1990 levels. Although this target 
is lower than scientists’ recommend in order to 
keep global warming below 2°C, the EU is one of 
the world’s most ambitions actors.
Several approaches should be scaled-up to ensure 
that a viable low-carbon strategy is transversally 
integrated across the EU’ major policy areas. 
1. Earmarking a significant share of the Juncker 
plan towards the energy and ecological transition 
This plan is designed to stimulate investment 
through the creation of a European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) which aims to leverage € 315 
billion of total investment between 2015 and 2017. 
The EFSI will be funded by a guarantee of € 16 
billion by the European Commission and € 5 billion 
pledged by the European Investment Bank, for a 
total initial capitalisation of € 21 billion. The EFSI 
aims at a multiplier effect of 1:15 on average in real 
investments (thus the base of € 21 billion for € 315 
billion euros of investments). The EFSI should be 
established within the EIB as a specialised fiduciary 
fund to ensure that it is rapidly operationalized 
and able to access existing EIB expertise. It would 
be desirable for Juncker plan financing to be 
conditional on climate co-benefits criteria and the 
prioritization of projects related to the implementation 
of the low-carbon transition (energy efficiency and 
technology projects) given the risk of locking-in 
new infrastructure supporting a carbon-intensive 
development model. 
2. Effectively supporting  
the EU ETS carbon price
The current price in the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme is estimated at 5 euros. This price signal 
is grossly insufficient to stimulate investment or to 
incentivise operational improvements from covered 
entities. EU ETS reform is underway and will 
start by withdrawing 900 million quotas from the 
auction calendar between 2014 and 2016. A more 
structural reform of the EU ETS will be implemented 
from 2019 with the creation of a “market stability 
reserve”3. Finally, the European Council validated, 
in October 2014, an increase in ambition for the EU 
ETS via a 43% emissions reduction target by 2030 
compared with 2005 levels.  
These reforms aim to avoid a new collapse in 
price in the short term and favor the emergence 
of a stronger carbon price signal of between 
€ 15-20 /tCO2e in 2020 and € 30-40/tCO2e in 
2030 according to latest market analysis forecast4. 
However, this target price remains almost 
invisible to economic actors. We thus propose that 
these estimated values be politically backed by 
governments in order to accelerate their integration 
in the economic forecasts made by economic actors. 
In addition, these prices levels are nevertheless well 
below those recommend by economists; we believe 
it is thus desirable to continue to propose means 
of reforming the EU ETS as soon as possible to 
increase ambition. 
3. Creating a financial regulatory framework 
favourable for financing the transition to a 
low-carbon economy, for which the EU is lar-
gely in charge of in Europe
The evolution of financial regulation aiming to reduce 
the barriers to the long-term financing of banks 
and institutional investors needs to be accelerated 
to foster the transition to a low-carbon economy as 
soon as possible. The European Commission has 
the responsibility to develop the principal regulatory 
frameworks for banks, insurances, pension funds, 
etc. We propose that France, and more largely the 
European Council, officially request that the European 
Commission address this issue and proposes a plan 
of action for the next 2 to 3 years to be delivered 
ahead of CoP21. 
Beyond its national borders, the EU also has a 
fundamental role in supporting the emissions 
reductions of its partners. This is particularly 
true given that EU Member States and the EU 
as a whole, are altogether the major donors of 
Official Development Assistance in the world. The 
inclusion of climate-related issues in the policies 
of the European Development Fund could be 
further strengthened. However, it is possible to 
go a step further by integrating climate into all 
development policies, whether for infrastructure 
resilience, support for “climate smart” agricultural 
policies, or the development of combined grants 
and loans that facilitate, for example, the increased 
leveraging of public financing in renewable energy 
projects for example. n
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4. MONITORING THE LONG  
TERM IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE ROADMAP TO FINANCE  
A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
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 Figure 26  A 360° strategy to finance a low-carbon economy
Source : Canfin/Grandjean, 2015
This roadmap in particular addresses issues related to carbon pricing, 
infrastructure financing, development banks and financial regulations. At this stage, 
there is no single international institution in charge of following such an agenda. Yet, 
part of the success of the political momentum fostered by CoP21 lies precisely in 
its ability to send a consistent, credible and strong long-term signal to economic 
decision-makers. Setting a long-term decarbonisation goal for the economy across 
the 21st Century is a key part of this process and the roadmap proposed in this 
report presents the financial component of this goal.
Given that the majority of financing of the economy is typically carried out at 
domestic level, the monitoring of the measures taken to finance the transition must 
be, first and foremost, anchored in national investment strategies. In the climate arena, 
this takes concrete form in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
submitted to the Climate Convention ahead of CoP21. When they exist, this should 
also be reflected in national economy-wide decarbonisation and adaptation plans. 
Our first recommendation is therefore to encourage Governments, beginning 
with developed countries, to produce national decarbonization strategies for their 
economies and its financing, both public and private. This measure was adopted, 
France is present in all international fora (G7, G20, International Monetary Fund’s 
and World Bank’s Board of Directors, OECD, etc.) in which the agenda to finance a 
low-carbon economy can be moved forward. This constitutes a major asset for the 
design of a consistent international roadmap dedicated to the mobilisation of public 
and private financing. 
4. MONITORING THE LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE ROADMAP TO FINANCE A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY
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in principle, by France in its law on energy transition for green growth and by G7 
countries in June 2015. Among the key indicators for such strategies could be 
the relative volume of ‘green’ investments compared with total global investments 
made each year, combined with annual targets. France could propose to the IMF 
to monitor this indicator, country by country, and to aggregate investment levels at 
the global level.
These strategies could, when relevant, use the OECD’s recent work that has, for 
the first time, analysed the alignment of public policies with a low-carbon, resilient 
transition and includes the taxation and financing of the broader economy.
This assessment has been officially released in June 2015. We propose that 
France be one of the first countries to apply the lessons learned from the report and 
assess the alignment of its public policies with the low-carbon transition; as well as 
invite other countries to do the same. 
 In addition to these national actions, the roadmap to finance a low-carbon 
economy proposed here should be monitored at the international level. As such, 
we recommend: 
– The IMF and the World Bank could be charged with the supervision and 
implementation of this roadmap, in coordination with the institutions deemed 
relevant to perform this task – particularly those under the UNFCCC. The objective 
will be to monitor in particular the developments in terms of carbon price signals 
(including the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies); the reforms removing barriers 
to investments in low-carbon infrastructure; the ‘2°C roadmaps’ of development 
banks; the integration of climate risk in financial regulation; the relative volume of 
‘green’ investments compared with total global investments; and the evolution in 
the decoupling of GDP and greenhouse gas emissions.
– The monitoring of reforms related to the inclusion of climate and carbon risks into 
financial regulation; as well as the commitments taken by private financial actors in 
order to build concretely on recent progress. As discussed above, the G20 Finance 
Ministers requested earlier this year that the Financial Stability Board analyse the 
potential impacts of climate change on financial stability. We propose that G20 include 
these recommendations in their 2016 work program. Furthermore, we recommend 
the creation of a public monitoring system for financial actors’ engagements that 
have multiplied in recent months, including: the integration of climate risk;, measuring 
greenhouse gas emissions induced by their financial activities; and increasing 
financing for the green economy. The UNFCCC’s Nazca Platform, which centralizes 
these commitments, can be used and further developed for CoP21 in order to increase 
the visibility of progress in this area within the broader ‘Agenda of Solutions.’ These 
commitments could be comprised in an annual public report.
In this process, it is essential to find the appropriate place for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The UNFCCC cannot ensure the 
monitoring and reporting on the ensemble of activities linked to the needed reforms; 
particularly in in arenas already under oversight of institutions - such as the Financial 
Stability Board. Nonetheless, it is important that the Standing Committee on 
Finance (SCF) be associated with the implementation and follow-up to the roadmap 
to finance a low-carbon economy. This could occur through its participation in 
associated work programs as well as regular reporting of the progress made to the 
relevant institutions of the UNFCCC. 
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ACRONYMS LIST
5. APPENDICES
ABS – Asset-backed security 
ADB – Asian Development Bank
ADEME - Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de 
l’Energie
ADF –  Asian Development Fund
AFD – Agence Française de Développement 
AfDB –  African Development Bank
APEC –  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
BAU –  Business as usual 
BNDES – National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development, Brazil
BNEF –  Bloomberg New Energy Finance
BRICS –  Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAPM –  Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Cat DDO –  Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option  
CCS –  Carbone capture and storage 
CO2 –  Carbon dioxide 
CoP –  Conference of Paris 
CPI –  Climate Policy Initiative 
DFI – Development finance institution
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECA – Export-credit agency 
ECB – European Central Bank 
EFSI –  European Fund for Strategic Investments
EIB – European Investment Bank
ETS –  Emissions trading scheme
EU – European Union
Fed –  Federal Reserve System
FTT – Financial transaction tax 
GDP –  Gross domestic product
GHG – Greenhouse gas 
GPFG – Government Pension Fund Global, Norway
GW – Gigawatt
IAS – International Accounting Standards 
IASB –  International Accounting Standards Board
ICAO –  International Civil Aviation Organization
ICR –  Issuer Credit Rating
IDA – International Development Association
IDFC –  International Development Finance Club 
IEA – International Energy Agency 
IFC – International Finance Corporation
IFRS –  International Financial Reporting Standards
IIGCC –  The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IMO – International Maritime Organization 
IPCC –  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRR – Intern rate of return
KfW – Établissement de crédit pour la reconstruction, 
Allemagne 
KWh –  Kilowatt-hour
LDC –  Least developed country
MDB – Multilateral development bank 
MIGA –  Multilateral Insurance and Guarantee Agency
NCE –  New Climate Economy 
NDB –  National development bank
NGO – Non-governmental organization
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
OFCE – Observatoire français des conjonctures 
économiques
OPIC –  Overseas Private Investment Corporation, United 
States 
PCS – Preferred creditor status 
PPP –  Purchasing power parity
PRG – Partial risk guarantee
PRGF - Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
REI4P –  Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Programme, South Africa 
SDR – Special drawing rights
SME – Small and medium-sized enterprises
TNO – Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific 
Research
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP FI –  United Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
UNSG – United Nations Secretary General 
WRI – World Resources Institute
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